CVE-2026-115770: Pocket ID: Email verification token remains valid after address change, enabling arbitrary verified-email spoofing
Pocket ID is an OIDC provider that allows users to authenticate with their passkeys to services. From 2.2.0 until 2.12.0, SendEmailVerification uses the token model in backend/internal/model/emailverificationtoken.go to bind an email-verification token only to the user's identifier, while UpdateUser can change the account email without invalidating the outstanding token and VerifyEmail marks the current address as verified. An ordinary user can request a token for an address they control, change the account to an arbitrary unused address, and redeem the old token so Pocket ID publishes the new address with emailverified set to true. The default affected configuration uses emailsVerified=false and allowOwnAccountEdit=true; the target address must not already belong to another Pocket ID user. A relying application that trusts a verified email for automatic account matching or provisioning can link the attacker's identity to another user's account, while applications that rely exclusively on the stable OIDC sub claim are not affected by that downstream consequence. This issue is fixed in version 2.12.0.
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
Pocket IDto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 2.12.0
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which deployments and relying applications are exposed to the most serious impact?
Pocket ID versions from 2.2.0 until 2.12.0 are affected. The default configuration is affected when emailsVerified=false and allowOwnAccountEdit=true; downstream account takeover or mis-linking requires a relying application to use a verified email address for automatic account matching or provisioning.
What does an attacker need to exploit this issue?
The attacker needs an ordinary Pocket ID user account and must be able to obtain an email-verification token for an address they control. They can then change their account email to an arbitrary unused address and redeem the outstanding token; the target address cannot already belong to another Pocket ID user.
Are applications that use Pocket ID's stable subject identifier affected?
Applications that rely exclusively on the stable OIDC sub claim are not affected by the described downstream account-linking consequence. The risk applies where the application treats email_verified as sufficient evidence for identity matching or provisioning.
What version fixes the issue?
Upgrade Pocket ID to version 2.12.0, which fixes the token handling issue.