CVE-2026-115776: Twisted: Unauthenticated Remote Denial of Service in the Twisted IRC Server via an Unbounded Line Buffer
Summary
An unbounded-buffer vulnerability (CWE-770) in the Twisted words IRC server lets any unauthenticated remote client exhaust server memory. twisted.words.protocols.irc.IRC.dataReceived appends every received byte to a per-connection buffer and only removes data at a line feed, with no maximum length. Because IRC is a plain Protocol and not a LineReceiver, one connection that streams bytes without a line feed grows the buffer without bound and drives the whole single-threaded process to out-of-memory, dropping every user at once. The twistd words server inherits the method unchanged through IRCUser, and the data is buffered before any authentication.
Details
IRC.dataReceived keeps everything up to the last line feed in self.buffer:
python twisted/words/protocols/irc.py class IRC(protocol.Protocol): # not a LineReceiver, so no MAXLENGTH buffer = "" def dataReceived(self, data): if isinstance(data, bytes): data = data.decode("utf-8") lines = (self.buffer + data).split(LF) self.buffer = lines.pop() # no 3line feed -> whole input stays buffered ...
With no line feed in the data, lines.pop() returns the entire accumulated content to self.buffer, so it grows by every chunk and is never bounded; IRC defines no MAXLENGTH, no lineLengthExceeded, and no timeout, so the connection is never closed. The twistd words server protocol IRCUser subclasses IRC without overriding dataReceived, and the buffer is filled before any PASS, NICK, or USER, so no credentials are required.
Affected product: Twisted (twisted.words), twisted.words.protocols.irc.IRC and its subclass twisted.words.service.IRCUser Affected versions: 26.4.0 and earlier
PoC
On a standard Twisted words IRC server (the server twistd words runs, using IRCUser), an unauthenticated client opens a single TCP connection and continuously sends data that contains no line feed, never completing a line. Every chunk is appended to the connection's line buffer, and because no complete line is ever formed none of it is consumed, so the buffer grows by the full volume sent.
In a measured run against a real IRCFactory server, one unauthenticated connection sending 60 MB of line-feed-free data raised the server process resident memory from about 47 MB to 2966 MB (roughly 49 MB per MB sent) with the connection still open and no limit triggered. Sending the same volume as normal line-feed-terminated commands leaves memory flat, which isolates the cause to the missing line-length bound.
Impact
An unauthenticated remote denial of service from allocation without limits (CWE-770) leading to uncontrolled resource consumption (CWE-400). A single credential-free connection exhausts the memory of the whole twistd words process, and because one process serves every user, the crash drops all connections at once and the service stays down until it is restarted. The quadratic buffer copy reaches the same effect faster. There is no confidentiality or integrity impact and no code execution.
Other sources
Twisted is an event-based framework for internet applications, supporting Python 3.6+. Prior to 26.10.0rc1, twisted.words.protocols.irc.IRC.dataReceived retains all bytes received without a line feed in its per-connection buffer and applies no maximum line length. The twisted.words.service.IRCUser server subclass inherits this behavior, and buffering occurs before PASS, NICK, or USER authentication commands. An unauthenticated connection can continuously grow the buffer until the shared server process runs out of memory and drops all users. This issue is fixed in version 26.10.0rc1.
— MITRE
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
pip/Twistedto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 26.10.0rc1 - Upgrade
Upgrade
Twistedto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 26.10.0rc1
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which deployments are exposed to this denial-of-service issue?
Deployments that use Twisted's IRC server functionality, specifically twisted.words.protocols.irc.IRC or the twisted.words.service.IRCUser server subclass, are affected before version 26.10.0rc1. The issue affects the server process because the buffer is maintained per connection but can exhaust memory shared by all users.
Does an attacker need an IRC account or valid credentials?
No. Buffering occurs before PASS, NICK, or USER authentication commands, so an unauthenticated remote connection can trigger the issue.
What traffic triggers the memory exhaustion?
An attacker can continuously send bytes without a line-feed character. The affected code retains those bytes in a per-connection buffer without enforcing a maximum line length, allowing the buffer to grow until the process runs out of memory.
What is the available remediation?
Upgrade Twisted to version 26.10.0rc1, which fixes the issue.