CVE-2026-115806: Prime Mover <= 2.2.1 - Unauthenticated PHP Object Injection via Base64-Encoded Comment during Migration Search-and-Replace

Published Oct 24, 2026
·
Updated

The Prime Mover – Backup and Migration plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to PHP Object Injection in all versions up to, and including, 2.2.1 via deserialization of untrusted input in the migration search-and-replace routine (recursiveUnserializeReplace()). An unauthenticated attacker can store a crafted, base64-encoded serialized object in wpcomments.commentcontent through the standard comment-submission endpoint (wp-comments-post.php). When an administrator subsequently performs a routine Prime Mover export or restore, the plugin base64-decodes that stored value and passes it to unserialize() with no allowedclasses restriction. A Property-Oriented Programming (POP) chain is present in the plugin's own bundled Freemius library (FSCloneManager::set → FSOptionManager::setoption → store() → updateoption()), so no additional plugin or theme is required — the plugin ships the gadget itself.

Affected Software

1 affected component
Prime Mover Prime Mover – Backup and Migration<=2.2.1

Event History

Oct 24, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·04:32 AM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·04:32 AM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness

Frequently Asked Questions

1

Who can exploit this issue?

An unauthenticated attacker can submit a crafted base64-encoded serialized object through WordPress's standard comment-submission endpoint, where it is stored in comment_content. Exploitation does not require another plugin or theme because the required POP chain is bundled with Prime Mover.

2

When does the malicious comment get processed?

The stored payload is triggered when an administrator performs a Prime Mover export or restore that uses the migration search-and-replace routine. The routine base64-decodes the stored value and passes it to unserialize() without an allowed_classes restriction.

3

Are sites exposed without a special Prime Mover configuration?

The described attack uses the standard WordPress comment-submission endpoint and routine Prime Mover export or restore activity. No additional plugin or theme is required for the POP chain.

4

How can I assess whether an exploit attempt may be present?

Review wp_comments.comment_content for suspicious base64-encoded serialized-object payloads, particularly in comments submitted before a Prime Mover export or restore. The relevant stored input is comment content submitted through wp-comments-post.php.

Contact

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