CVE-2026-116244: pgAdmin 4: libpq uses the pgAdmin service account's Kerberos credentials

Published Oct 30, 2026
·
Updated

When a pgAdmin 4 connection was not meant to use a Kerberos user's delegated credentials, pgAdmin removed KRB5CCNAME from its environment, so the Kerberos library fell back to the default credential cache, or a client keytab, of the operating-system account running pgAdmin. libpq then answered any server that asked for GSSAPI authentication with that account's ticket, whatever user name the pgAdmin user gave, so in server mode any user could connect as the service account's Kerberos principal; gssencmode=disable did not prevent it. On Windows, SSPI used the service account's logon in the same way. psql was also started with pgAdmin's environment, which could hold another user's credential cache while that user was connecting.

The fix points KRB5CCNAME and KRB5CLIENTKTNAME at a file that cannot exist except while a Kerberos-authenticated user connects with Kerberos, and gives every other connection, psql and the utilities requireauth=!gss,!sspi and gssencmode=disable, checked on the final connection string. requireauth needs libpq 16 or later.

This issue affects pgAdmin 4: before 9.19.

Event History

Oct 30, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·07:55 PM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·07:55 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness
Data Sourced
via NVD·08:17 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness

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