CVE-2026-116576: systeminformation vulnerable to Windows command injection in services() through Unicode quotation marks
Summary
On Windows, systeminformation@5.33.15 builds a PowerShell command using the value passed to services(). The default sanitizer removes ASCII quotes but keeps Unicode curly quotes, spaces, and parentheses. A crafted service name can use those characters to break out of the generated filter string and run a PowerShell expression. The expression runs with the permissions of the Node.js process.
This report confirms version 5.33.15. Other package versions have not been checked.
Details
In lib/processes.js, services() sanitizes the caller's string with sanitizeShellString() and later inserts each resulting name into a Get-CimInstance Win32Service -Filter command. The Windows branch passes that command to util.powerShell().
The sanitizer in lib/util.js removes the ASCII double quote, but it does not remove U+201C or U+201D, the left and right curly double quotation marks. It also permits spaces and parentheses when called in its default, non-strict mode. PowerShell accepts the curly marks as string delimiters, so an input can end the filter string and place a command expression in the generated command.
For example, the input below uses curly quotation marks to end the generated filter string and execute New-Item. I reproduced this call on Windows against the checked-out systeminformation@5.33.15 source; it created a marker file with the Node.js process account.
Proof of concept
Run this on Windows in a disposable directory with Node.js and PowerShell available:
powershell mkdir si-command-injection-repro cd si-command-injection-repro npm init -y npm install systeminformation@5.33.15
Save the following as poc.cjs, then run node poc.cjs:
js 'use strict';
const fs = require('node:fs'); const path = require('node:path'); const si = require('systeminformation');
(async () => { const markerName = si-injection-${process.pid}.txt; const markerPath = path.join(process.cwd(), markerName); fs.rmSync(markerPath, { force: true });
try { await si.services(not-a-service” (New-Item -Name ${markerName} -ItemType File -Force) “); console.log(markerCreated=${fs.existsSync(markerPath)}); } finally { fs.rmSync(markerPath, { force: true }); } })().catch((error) => { console.error(error); process.exitCode = 1; });
Expected output:
text markerCreated=true
The Windows run returned an array and created the marker (markerCreated: true). A benign input left the marker absent. The script removes the marker afterward. I did not identify an application network route that forwards remote input to services(), so remote exploitability depends on the consuming application.
Impact
An application that passes attacker-controlled input to services() on Windows can execute PowerShell commands with the Node.js process account's permissions. Depending on that account, commands may read or change accessible files, alter application data, or disrupt the service. I searched this repository for HTTP servers, route handlers, and listener calls and found none. services() is exposed through the package API and getDynamicData(), so a consuming application could make the input network-reachable if it forwards request data. A separate loopback HTTP harness did trigger the command through a query parameter, but that server was test code and is not part of this repository. The project's docs/security.html already warns that arbitrary untrusted input to services() needs caution because package sanitization does not cover every case.
Other sources
systeminformation is a System and OS information library for node.js. Prior to 5.33.16, services() in lib/processes.js inserts a caller-supplied service name into a PowerShell Get-CimInstance filter after processing it with sanitizeShellString() in lib/util.js. On Windows, the sanitizer removes ASCII quotes but permits Unicode quotation marks that PowerShell accepts as string delimiters, allowing crafted input to terminate the filter and place a PowerShell expression in the command executed by util.powerShell(). The expression runs with the Node.js process account's permissions and may read or change accessible files, alter application data, or disrupt the service. The package does not expose a network service itself, so remote reachability depends on a consuming application forwarding attacker-controlled input to services() or getDynamicData(). This issue is fixed in version 5.33.16.
— MITRE
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
npm/systeminformationto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 5.33.16
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which deployments are realistically exposed to remote exploitation?
The package does not expose a network service itself. Remote exploitation depends on a consuming application passing attacker-controlled input into services() or getDynamicData(), and the vulnerable command construction occurs on Windows.
What access or input does an attacker need?
An attacker needs control over a service-name value that reaches services() or getDynamicData(). They can use Unicode quotation marks accepted by PowerShell as delimiters to escape the intended filter and inject a PowerShell expression.
What permissions would injected commands have?
The injected PowerShell expression runs with the permissions of the Node.js process account. Its impact is limited by that account's access, but may include reading or modifying accessible files and application data or disrupting the service.
What should be done to remediate the issue?
Upgrade systeminformation to version 5.33.16, which fixes the issue. If upgrading cannot happen immediately, ensure untrusted input cannot reach services() or getDynamicData().