CVE-2026-116689: follow-redirects: Cross-realm sensitiveHeaders arrays are discarded and custom credentials can follow redirects
Summary
follow-redirects 1.16.0 and 1.16.1 validate the documented sensitiveHeaders option with instanceof Array. An array created in another JavaScript realm is silently replaced with an empty list, so a caller-declared custom credential header can be forwarded to an attacker-controlled cross-origin redirect destination.
Details
Affected versions
The sensitiveHeaders option was introduced in 1.16.0. Published 1.16.0 and 1.16.1 both reproduced, giving a tested affected range of 1.16.0 through 1.16.1. The source checkout was pinned at revision 46301256333c90b7faac7aa126effe72ec16d16e; the exact npm 1.16.1 artifact reproduced independently.
Root cause
index.js resets options.sensitiveHeaders when its local isArray() helper returns false. That helper uses value instanceof Array, which depends on realm identity. The same file already uses Array.isArray(options.headers), which correctly recognizes arrays across realms.
Suggested remediation
Use Array.isArray(value) for sensitiveHeaders, then validate and normalize each member as a header-name string. Add same-realm and node:vm cross-realm tests for cross-origin redirects, including the array-form headers representation. Verify that custom sensitive names are removed while unrelated headers remain unchanged.
Duplicate review
The public advisory history contains other sensitive-header findings, including array-form headers and regular-expression handling, but focused repository searches found no report describing cross-realm validation as of 2026-10-25. A private or differently worded report may already exist.
Proof of concept
Start two loopback HTTP servers. The first returns a 302 redirect to the second. Send X-API-Key and list that name in sensitiveHeaders, then compare a normal array with a genuine cross-realm array created by:
js const vm = require('node:vm'); const sensitiveHeaders = vm.runInNewContext(['X-API-Key']);
Observed against both source and the exact npm 1.16.1 package:
- Same-realm ['X-API-Key']: the redirect target did not receive the key. - Cross-realm ['X-API-Key']: Array.isArray(value) was true, value instanceof Array was false, and the redirect target received X-API-Key. - An unrelated X-Harmless header remained present in both cases.
The complete 3.5 KB loopback-only harness and raw JSON output are available privately.
Impact
custom credential disclosure. Exploitation requires a direct caller or wrapper that preserves a cross-realm sensitiveHeaders array, a custom credential listed in that option, and an attacker-controlled or compromised endpoint that returns a cross-origin redirect. The directly demonstrated result is disclosure of the custom header value, potentially exposing an API key or service token until revocation.
Built-in Authorization, Proxy-Authorization, and Cookie protections remained effective. Exact Axios 1.20.0 with follow-redirects 1.16.1 did not reproduce because Axios normalized the array; this report does not claim that Axios is affected. No third-party service was tested.
Other sources
follow-redirects is a Node.js HTTP and HTTPS client wrapper that automatically follows redirects. From 1.16.0 until 1.16.2, the documented sensitiveHeaders option is checked with value instanceof Array, so an array created in another JavaScript realm is replaced with an empty list even though Array.isArray recognizes it. When a request then follows an attacker-controlled cross-origin redirect, a custom credential header named in that discarded list can be forwarded to the redirect destination. This issue is fixed in version 1.16.2.
— Ubuntu
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
npm/follow-redirectsto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 1.16.2 - Upgrade
Upgrade
debian/node-follow-redirectsto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 1.16.3+~1.14.4-1 - Upgrade
Upgrade
follow-redirectsto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 1.16.2
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
What conditions are required for credential exposure?
The application must supply sensitiveHeaders as an array created in another JavaScript realm, include a custom credential header in that list, and follow an attacker-controlled cross-origin redirect. Under those conditions, the header can be forwarded to the redirect destination.
Are applications using the documented sensitiveHeaders option automatically protected?
Not if the option is passed as an array from another JavaScript realm. The affected check discards that array, leaving the custom headers it named unprotected during redirects.
What is the recommended remediation?
Upgrade follow-redirects to version 1.16.2, which fixes the issue.
How can I identify potentially affected usage?
Review use of follow-redirects from version 1.16.0 until the 1.16.2 fix, especially code that passes sensitiveHeaders across JavaScript realm boundaries and sends custom credential headers to endpoints that may redirect across origins.