CVE-2026-117601: Electrum: Malicious server can replace a just-broadcast tx and try to trick user into RBF-ing it

Published Oct 27, 2026
·
Updated

Summary

The main Electrum server the client connects to is trusted with mempool ("unconfirmed") transactions. This is documented design. [0]

However now someone figured out a way to practically exploit it: - when the client broadcasts a new tx1, a malicious server can swallow it, - and update the client's history with a conflicting (invalid) tx2 that replaces the outputs with the attacker's output address. - Tx2 has invalid signatures, but this is not checked (due to light client design). - The wallet will display tx2 as an unconfirmed transaction - tx1 will not be displayed. - If the client then manually RBF fee-bumps tx2, the client will sign it with a higher fee, and hence pay the attacker.

Fixes

Commit 90fe30822 contains the fix [1], included in version 4.8.3. The client now verifies the signatures of wallet.ismine inputs for mempool txs (before adding them to its local history).

Users should upgrade (and regularly do so in any case). As a workaround, without upgrading, when signing any transaction, for bumping the fee or not, they should verify the output addresses and amounts are as expected.

Clients that connect to servers they trust (e.g. run their own) are not affected.

Remarks

- some servers are performing this attack in the wild - electrum received two user-reports of this. user1 noticed after broadcasting tx1 the wallet history contained a different tx. user2 bumped the fee of tx2 and lost money. - user1 reported tx1 was not propagated over the bitcoin p2p, so the server held it - both reported the attacker's output address in tx2 was grinded to match the last four chars of the legit address from tx1 - based on user2's report, the server constructed a tx2 with zero fee (presumably in hope of the user bumping its fee) - even with the fix, we still only validate "ismine" inputs (i.e. paying from addresses that the wallet owns). So e.g. "incoming" txs are not validated. The client lacks a full consensus engine / script interpreter, though even with that, to cover non-ismine inputs, it would have to validate the unconfirmed parents recursively until reaching mined txs. Mined txs we already SPV.

Timeline

- 2026-10-11: user1 sends private disclosure, but the bumpfee vector is not realised - 2026-10-18: user2 (Raju-K12) reports privately that they lost money after bumpfee - 2026-10-23: version 4.8.3 git tagged, with the fix - 2026-10-24: version 4.8.3 binaries released - 2026-10-24: public disclosure

Credits

Electrum thanks user1 and Raju-K12 for finding and responsibly disclosing this issue to us.

Other sources

Electrum before 4.8.3 fails to verify signatures of wallet-owned inputs in unconfirmed mempool transactions, allowing malicious servers to replace a just-broadcast transaction with a conflicting one. Attackers can swallow the user's transaction and display an invalid zero-fee copy paying an attacker address, tricking users into RBF fee-bumping and signing it.

— MITRE

Affected Software

6 affected componentsFixes available
Electrum Electrum<4.8.3
pip/electrum<4.8.3
4.8.3
debian/electrum<4.3.4+dfsg1-1+deb12u2
4.3.4+dfsg1-1+deb12u2
debian/electrum*
debian/electrum<4.8.3+dfsg-1
4.8.3+dfsg-1
debian/electrum<=4.3.4+dfsg1-1+deb12u1, <=4.5.8+ds-6
4.3.4+dfsg1-1+deb12u24.8.4+dfsg-1

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Upgrade

    Upgrade pip/electrum to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 4.8.3
  2. Upgrade

    Upgrade debian/electrum to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 4.3.4+dfsg1-1+deb12u2
  3. Upgrade

    Upgrade debian/electrum to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 4.8.3+dfsg-1
  4. Upgrade

    Upgrade debian/electrum to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 4.3.4+dfsg1-1+deb12u2Fixed in 4.8.4+dfsg-1
  5. Upgrade

    Upgrade Electrum to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 4.8.3Patch 90fe30822
  6. Compensating control

    Without upgrading, when signing any transaction, including fee-bumped transactions, verify that the output addresses and amounts are as expected.

  7. Compensating control

    Connect the client only to trusted servers, such as a server you run yourself.

Event History

Oct 27, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·01:09 PM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·01:09 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness
Data Sourced
via NVD·02:16 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness
Oct 28, 2026
Advisory Published
via GitHub·09:23 PM
Data Sourced
via GitHub·09:23 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeaknessAffected Software
Nov 20, 2026
Data Sourced
via OSV·03:00 AM
Affected Software

Peer vulnerabilities

Found alongside the following vulnerabilities.

Frequently Asked Questions

1

Who is exposed to this issue?

Users of Electrum versions before 4.8.3 are exposed when handling unconfirmed transactions through a malicious server. The attack targets wallet-owned inputs in mempool transactions.

2

What must an attacker do to exploit the issue?

The attacker must operate or control a server that can replace a just-broadcast transaction with a conflicting transaction. They then rely on the user being tricked into using RBF fee bumping and signing the displayed replacement.

3

Is user interaction required for impact?

Yes. The user must be induced to RBF fee-bump and sign the invalid zero-fee transaction copy that pays an attacker-controlled address.

4

What is the remediation?

Update Electrum to version 4.8.3 or later. Versions before 4.8.3 do not verify the relevant signatures in unconfirmed mempool transactions.

Contact

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