CVE-2026-118260: Echo: BodyDump captures request and response bodies without size limits in v4
Impact
Echo v4's opt-in BodyDump middleware read complete request bodies into memory and retained complete response bodies without a capture limit. A client able to submit large requests to a route using BodyDump could cause large allocations before the application handler ran. Large responses, including responses whose size can be influenced by a client, also caused an additional unbounded capture allocation.
Repeated or concurrent requests can exhaust process memory and cause denial of service. BodyDump is not enabled by default. Deployments with effective request limits may reduce the request-side exposure; response capture requires separate consideration.
Affected versions and patch
Echo v4 versions through v4.16.0 are affected. Upgrade to v4.16.1.
The patch adds BodyDumpConfig.MaxRequestBytes and MaxResponseBytes, each defaulting to 5 MiB when zero. A value of -1 explicitly restores unlimited capture. The complete request remains readable by the handler and the complete response is delivered to the client; only the callback's captured data is bounded. Request close behavior and read errors are preserved.
Fix commit.
Workarounds
Disable BodyDump on exposed routes, particularly large uploads and downloads. Alternatively, enforce body-size limits before BodyDump and independently bound the responses that the application generates.
Credits
Reported by @q490107865. The patch also incorporates request-body preservation work from @jakezwang in #3105.
Other sources
Echo is a Go web framework. From 4.0.0 until 4.16.1, Echo v4's opt-in BodyDump middleware reads complete request bodies into memory before handlers run and retains complete response bodies for the dump callback without capture limits. An unauthenticated client that can reach a route using BodyDump can submit large bodies or influence large responses, causing repeated or concurrent allocations that exhaust process memory. BodyDump is not enabled by default, and external request limits may reduce request-side exposure but do not bound response capture. This issue is fixed in 4.16.1.
— Debian
Echo: BodyDump captures request and response bodies without size limits in v4 in github.com/labstack/echo
— OSV
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
go/github.com/labstack/echo/v4to a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 4.16.1 - Upgrade
Upgrade
github.com/labstack/echoto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 4.16.1 - Configuration
Disable BodyDump on exposed routes, particularly routes handling large uploads or downloads.
Echo v4 BodyDump middleware BodyDump = disabled
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Who is exposed to this issue?
Applications using Echo v4 from 4.0.0 through 4.16.1 are exposed only if they enable the opt-in BodyDump middleware on a reachable route. BodyDump is not enabled by default.
What does an attacker need to do to trigger memory exhaustion?
An unauthenticated client must be able to reach a route using BodyDump. They can send large request bodies or cause the route to generate large responses; repeated or concurrent requests can exhaust process memory.
Do request-size limits fully mitigate the issue?
No. External request limits may reduce exposure from oversized request bodies, but they do not limit BodyDump's capture of response bodies.
What should be done if an immediate upgrade is not possible?
Disable BodyDump on reachable routes if possible. If it must remain enabled, restrict access to those routes and reduce the ability for clients to submit large request bodies or induce large responses; request limits alone do not address response capture.
How can I determine whether my application is affected?
Check whether the application uses Echo v4 between 4.0.0 and 4.16.1 and whether BodyDump middleware is enabled for any route reachable by untrusted clients. Upgrading to 4.16.1 fixes the issue.