CVE-2026-123802: SuperTokens Core SAML: identity taken from an assertion that never passed the audience check, allowing sign-in as any IdP user
SuperTokens Core is an open source authentication server. From 11.3.0 until 11.3.8, 11.4.8, 12.0.11, 12.1.2, 12.2.1, and 12.3.1, a licensed deployment with a configured SAML client can authenticate an identity from an assertion that did not satisfy the audience check. When the identity provider uses assertion-level signing, an attacker who has a still-valid IdP-signed assertion naming the victim for any audience and the attacker's own valid assertion for the target audience can combine them because validateSamlResponseAudience accepts an audience from one assertion while extractAllClaims takes the final NameID and attributes from another; response-level signing does not expose this multi-assertion variant. Independently, an assertion from an identity provider configured for the target deployment but issued to another SuperTokens deployment using the shared default samlspentityid can satisfy the target's audience check. Successful exploitation authenticates the attacker as the victim IdP user. This issue is fixed in versions 11.3.8, 11.4.8, 12.0.11, 12.1.2, 12.2.1, and 12.3.1.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
SuperTokens Coreto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 11.3.8 - Upgrade
Upgrade
SuperTokens Coreto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 11.4.8 - Upgrade
Upgrade
SuperTokens Coreto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 12.0.11 - Upgrade
Upgrade
SuperTokens Coreto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 12.1.2 - Upgrade
Upgrade
SuperTokens Coreto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 12.2.1 - Upgrade
Upgrade
SuperTokens Coreto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 12.3.1
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which deployments are exposed?
Affected deployments are licensed SuperTokens Core instances with a configured SAML client, running versions from 11.3.0 before the listed fixed releases. The assertion-combination attack applies when the identity provider uses assertion-level signing; response-level signing does not expose that variant.
What does an attacker need to exploit the assertion-level signing variant?
The attacker needs a still-valid IdP-signed assertion naming the victim for any audience, plus their own valid assertion for the target audience. They can combine the audience accepted from one assertion with the NameID and attributes taken from the other, resulting in authentication as the victim.
Can the shared default SAML service-provider entity ID create exposure across deployments?
Yes. An assertion issued by an IdP configured for the target deployment, but intended for another SuperTokens deployment using the shared default saml_sp_entity_id, can satisfy the target deployment's audience check.
What versions contain the fix?
Upgrade to 11.3.8, 11.4.8, 12.0.11, 12.1.2, 12.2.1, or 12.3.1, as appropriate for the release line in use.