CVE-2026-125275: A device certificate whose CA isn't registered can keep a TLS handshake running forever
Summary
Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop') vulnerability in device certificate verification in nerves-hub nerveshubweb allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause a denial of service via a TLS client certificate whose CA is not registered. When a client certificate chains to a root in the device endpoint's trust store but no CA in the chain is registered in NervesHub, NervesHub.SSL.decide/2 refuses it with the reason :unknownca. Erlang/OTP ssl reads that reason as a missing trust anchor, looks for an alternative root, finds the same root and validates again without end. The handshake process queries the database on each pass and keeps running after the client disconnects, until the node restarts.
The device endpoint trusts the public roots from CAStore unless DEVICESSLCACERTFILE is set, so a client certificate from a public CA whose chain allows client authentication is sufficient. A chain that ends at a root outside the trust store is refused once.
This issue affects nerveshub: from 1.0.0 before 2.5.4.
Details
1. Refusal reason. The device endpoint gives ssl the verify function NervesHub.DeviceLink.PeerVerification.verifyfun/3, which asks NervesHub.SSL.decide/2. For a :validpeer event on a certificate that is not on file, decide/2 tries to register the certificate. checkknownca/1 in lib/nerveshub/ssl.ex looks for the signer among the registered CAs and returns :unknownca when it finds none. doverify/2 passes that to ssl as {:fail, :unknownca}.
2. Retry in ssl. unknownca is also the reason Erlang/OTP uses for a path with no trust anchor. In sslhandshake:pathvalidate/11, a {badcert, unknownca} result makes ssl look for a cross-signed alternative root and validate again. Unlike the rootcertexpired branch, this branch does not add the root it tried to the list of roots to skip.
3. Loop. When the chain ends at a self-signed root in the trust store, ssl finds the same root, calls the verify function again, and receives unknownca again. The recursion is a tail call, so the process does not grow or crash. It does not return to its mailbox, so it sees neither the handshake timeout nor the closed socket. Each pass runs the database queries of the registration checks.
Proof of concept
1. Make a self-signed root and a client certificate signed by it, directly or through an intermediate that the client sends. Do not register either CA in NervesHub. 2. Run a device endpoint whose trust store holds that root, by adding it to the DEVICESSLCACERTFILE bundle. Against the default trust store, a client certificate from a public CA replaces steps 1 and 2. 3. Open one TLS connection to the device endpoint with that certificate, then disconnect. 4. The handshake process on the server keeps running. The nerveshub.ssl.fail telemetry event with reason unknownca and the database queries repeat until the node restarts.
Impact
An unauthenticated client can leave a handshake process on a device node running and querying the database after it disconnects. Each further connection adds another such process, and they stop only when the node restarts. Devices and users of the instance lose service while the nodes and the database are saturated.
Workarounds
Set DEVICESSLCACERTFILE to a bundle that holds no public root and no root that signs device certificates, for example a file with one self-signed certificate made for this purpose. A certificate from an unregistered CA is then refused once and the handshake ends. Devices whose certificate or CA is registered in NervesHub continue to connect.
Restarting a node ends the handshakes that are already stuck on it.
Configurations
The certificate chain must end at a root in the device endpoint's trust store. With DEVICESSLCACERTFILE unset, which is the default from 2.0.0, the trust store holds the public roots from CAStore. With DEVICESSLCACERTFILE set to a bundle that holds a root which signs device certificates, any certificate from that root whose CA is not registered is sufficient, including the certificate of a deleted device.
The retry in Erlang/OTP ssl was confirmed on Erlang/OTP 28.3, 29.0 and 29.1. Earlier releases were not checked.
Other sources
Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop') vulnerability in device certificate verification in nerves-hub nerveshubweb allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause a denial of service via a TLS client certificate whose CA is not registered. When a client certificate chains to a root in the device endpoint's trust store but no CA in the chain is registered in NervesHub, NervesHub.SSL.decide/2 refuses it with the reason :unknownca. Erlang/OTP ssl reads that reason as a missing trust anchor, looks for an alternative root, finds the same root and validates again without end. The handshake process queries the database on each pass and keeps running after the client disconnects, until the node restarts.
The device endpoint trusts the public roots from CAStore unless DEVICESSLCACERTFILE is set, so a client certificate from a public CA whose chain allows client authentication is sufficient. A chain that ends at a root outside the trust store is refused once.
This issue affects nerveshub: from 1.0.0 before 2.5.4.
— MITRE
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade to a fixed release to a version that resolves this vulnerability.
Fixed in 2.5.4 - Configuration
Set DEVICE_SSL_CACERTFILE to a bundle containing no public root and no root that signs device certificates; the material gives a self-signed certificate made for this purpose as an example.
NervesHub device endpoint DEVICE_SSL_CACERTFILE = A bundle containing no public root and no root that signs device certificates - Operational
Restart a node to end TLS handshakes already stuck on that node.
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which deployments are exposed by default?
Device endpoints that use the default CAStore public root trust store are exposed. The default is used unless DEVICE_SSL_CACERTFILE is set.
What does an attacker need to trigger the denial of service?
An unauthenticated remote attacker needs a TLS client certificate chaining to a public trusted root whose chain permits client authentication, while no CA in that chain is registered in NervesHub. A certificate chain ending at a root outside the endpoint trust store is refused once and does not trigger the loop.
Which versions should be remediated?
The issue affects nerves_hub versions from 1.0.0 before 2.5.4. Upgrade to 2.5.4 or later.
How can operators recognize an active attack or prior impact?
The affected TLS handshake repeatedly validates the same chain and queries the database on every pass. The handshake process continues after the client disconnects and remains until the node is restarted.
What configuration can reduce exposure before upgrading?
Set DEVICE_SSL_CACERTFILE rather than relying on the default CAStore public root trust store. This is relevant because the vulnerable condition requires a client chain to a root trusted by the device endpoint.