CVE-2026-126752: Dagu affected by unauthenticated RCE via inline DAG spec in default configuration
Summary Dagu's default configuration ships with authentication disabled. The POST /api/v2/dag-runs endpoint accepts an inline YAML spec and executes its shell commands immediately with no credentials required — any dagu instance reachable over the network is fully compromised by default.
Details internal/service/app/config/loader.go:226 sets AuthModeNone as the default. With no auth mode configured, internal/frontend/api/v2/handlers/api.go:520 returns nil from requireExecute() — all permission checks pass without a valid session.
The POST /api/v2/dag-runs endpoint accepts a spec field containing a full YAML DAG definition. The spec is parsed and the commands execute immediately on the host with no validation beyond YAML parsing.
PoC bash curl -s -X POST http://TARGET:8080/api/v2/dag-runs \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"name":"poc","spec":"steps:\n - name: rce\n command: id > /tmp/pwned\n"}' Response: {"dagRunId":"<uuid>"} /tmp/pwned contains: uid=1000(dagu) gid=1000(dagu) Confirmed on ghcr.io/dagu-org/dagu:latest with no configuration changes.
Impact Every dagu deployment using default settings — every Docker deployment, every install following the documentation, every instance without explicit DAGUAUTHMODE configuration — is fully compromised without credentials. An attacker with network access gets OS command execution as the dagu process user.
Other sources
Dagu 1.23.0 before 2.0.0 defaults auth.mode to none, allowing unauthenticated attackers to execute OS commands through the /api/v2/dag-runs endpoint. Attackers can send a POST request with an inline spec defining steps containing arbitrary shell commands to achieve remote code execution. Exploitation evidence was first observed by the Shadowserver Foundation on 2026-03-11.
— MITRE
Dagu affected by unauthenticated RCE via inline DAG spec in default configuration in github.com/dagu-org/dagu
— OSV