CVE-2026-129237: qbee-agent: Docker Compose build context Zip Slip writes outside context directory
qbee-agent is the device agent component of the qbee.io IoT device management platform. Prior to 2026.41, the unpackTar extraction logic in app/utils/tar.go validates cleaned archive entry paths with strings.HasPrefix(targetPath, destdirClean) without enforcing a path-separator boundary. When UseContext enables the Docker Compose build context path in app/configuration/bundledockercompose.go, a less-privileged archive supplier with delegated configuration and/or file-manager access can provide a sibling-prefix traversal entry that passes the check, causing utils.UnpackTar to create directories and regular files outside the intended context extraction directory with qbee-agent process privileges, despite the supplier lacking authority to write those sibling files. In deployments where only full device or fleet administrators can provide Docker Compose context archives, this behavior is hardening rather than a crossed security boundary. The demonstrated impact is limited to nearby cache or project paths sharing the destination prefix, may affect integrity or availability of qbee-agent-managed Docker Compose state, and does not establish arbitrary absolute-path writes or direct code execution. This issue is fixed in version 2026.41.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
qbee-agentto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 2026.41
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Who can realistically exploit this issue?
Exploitation requires a less-privileged user or principal that can supply Docker Compose build-context archives through delegated configuration and/or file-manager access. If only full device or fleet administrators can provide those archives, the issue is described as hardening rather than a crossed security boundary.
What configuration must be enabled for the vulnerable extraction path to be used?
The Docker Compose build context path must be enabled through UseContext. The issue occurs while qbee-agent unpacks the archive used for that build context.
What can an attacker write outside the intended directory?
A crafted sibling-prefix traversal archive entry can cause qbee-agent to create directories and regular files in nearby cache or project paths that share the destination prefix. The available information does not establish arbitrary absolute-path writes or direct code execution.
How can I determine whether a system is affected?
Systems running qbee-agent versions prior to 2026.41 are affected when UseContext is enabled and a delegated, less-privileged party can supply Docker Compose context archives. Systems where archive submission is restricted to full device or fleet administrators do not have the described privilege-boundary exposure.