CVE-2026-129306: libspdm: libspdm_x509_verify_cert_chain() does not verify CA nameConstraints / pathLenConstraint
libspdm is a sample implementation that follows the DMTF SPDM specifications. Prior to 3.8.3 and 4.0.0-rc2, libspdmx509verifycertchain() in osstub/cryptlibopenssl/pk/x509.c and osstub/cryptlibmbedtls/pk/x509.c validates certificate signatures one link at a time instead of validating the complete X.509 path. In deployments using a pinned root with a constrained multi-tier PKI, an attacker holding a valid issuer credential below a constrained CA can present a subordinate certificate that exceeds pathLenConstraint or nameConstraints and may be accepted for SPDM identity validation. Exploitation requires the application to use libspdm's backend validation without an additional certificate-chain validation mechanism, the pinned root cannot be substituted, and the deployment's measurement policy must allow identity impersonation alone to satisfy its acceptance requirements. The mbedTLS backend remains unable to enforce nameConstraints because upstream mbedTLS does not implement that check. The full-chain validation changes are released in versions 3.8.3 and 4.0.0-rc2.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
libspdmto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 3.8.3 - Upgrade
Upgrade
libspdmto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 4.0.0-rc2
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which deployments are realistically exposed?
Exposure is limited to deployments using libspdm backend certificate validation without an additional certificate-chain validation mechanism, with a pinned root and a constrained multi-tier PKI. The measurement policy must also allow identity impersonation alone to meet acceptance requirements.
What does an attacker need to exploit this?
The attacker needs a valid issuer credential beneath a constrained CA. They can then present a subordinate certificate that violates pathLenConstraint or nameConstraints; they cannot substitute the pinned root.
Are all libspdm cryptographic backends equally remediated by the released changes?
No. The mbedTLS backend remains unable to enforce nameConstraints because upstream mbedTLS does not implement that check. The released full-chain validation changes are available in libspdm 3.8.3 and 4.0.0-rc2.