CVE-2026-129840: GitHub Actions pull_request_target code injection in nrfconnect/ncs-zigbee (build_documentation.yml)

Published Nov 20, 2026
·
Updated

In the nrfconnect/ncs-zigbee repository, the GitHub Actions workflow .github/workflows/builddocumentation.yml used the pullrequesttarget trigger while checking out and executing untrusted pull request code. This allowed a pull request from a fork to run attacker-controlled code in the base repository context with a write-scoped GITHUBTOKEN (contents: write, pages: write, pull-requests: write), enabling remote code execution in CI, token exfiltration, and unauthorized modification of repository content and GitHub Pages. The workflow was disabled and then rewritten to remove the issue.

Affected Software

1 affected component
nrfconnect ncs-zigbee

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Configuration

    Disable the workflow to prevent it from running pull request code in the base repository.

    .github/workflows/build_documentation.yml workflow enabled = false

Event History

Nov 20, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·08:46 AM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·08:46 AM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness
Data Sourced
via NVD·09:19 AM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness

Frequently Asked Questions

1

Who could exploit the affected workflow?

An attacker able to open a pull request from a fork could exploit it. No prior repository permissions or user interaction were required.

2

What access could attacker-controlled workflow code obtain?

The code ran in the base repository context with a write-scoped GITHUB_TOKEN granting contents: write, pages: write, and pull-requests: write. This could enable token exfiltration and unauthorized changes to repository content or GitHub Pages.

3

What should maintainers do if they cannot immediately apply the rewritten workflow?

Disable the affected build_documentation.yml workflow. The described exposure depends on the pull_request_target workflow checking out and executing untrusted pull-request code.

4

How can maintainers determine whether they were exposed?

Review whether build_documentation.yml used pull_request_target and checked out or executed code supplied by forked pull requests. Also review workflow runs and repository or GitHub Pages changes for activity performed through the write-scoped GITHUB_TOKEN.

Contact

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