CVE-2026-130008: sqlite-mcp: Read-only mode bypass via statement chaining and SQL injection in describe_table
sqlite-mcp is a Model Context Protocol server for SQLite. Prior to 0.1.2, the default read-only mode can be bypassed through executequery, which accepts a leading SELECT while the SQLite driver executes trailing statements, and through describetable, which interpolates the caller-controlled tablename into PRAGMA tableinfo. Either path can issue ATTACH DATABASE, which opens an attached file read-write despite mode=ro and can make the protected database writable, read other SQLite database files, or create a SQLite-format file at a path writable by the server process. Existing non-empty files that are not SQLite databases are refused and left unchanged. The server has no built-in authentication and listens on all interfaces at :8080 by default, so any client that can reach the port can invoke these tools unless an authenticating proxy is in place. This issue is fixed in version 0.1.2.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade to a fixed release to a version that resolves this vulnerability.
Fixed in 0.1.2 - Compensating control
Place an authenticating proxy in front of the server so clients cannot invoke its tools without authentication.
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which deployments are most exposed?
Instances running versions before 0.1.2 are affected even when using the default read-only mode. By default, the server listens on all interfaces at port 8080 and has no built-in authentication, so any network client able to reach that port can invoke the vulnerable tools unless an authenticating proxy is used.
Does an attacker need credentials or prior access to exploit this?
No. The vulnerable server has no built-in authentication, and exploitation only requires network access to the service port when no authenticating proxy restricts access.
What can an attacker do through the bypass?
An attacker can use statement chaining in execute_query or SQL injection through describe_table to issue ATTACH DATABASE. This can make the protected database writable, read other SQLite database files, or create a SQLite-format file at a location writable by the server process; non-empty files that are not SQLite databases are refused and remain unchanged.
What should be done if upgrading cannot happen immediately?
Prevent untrusted clients from reaching port 8080 and place the service behind an authenticating proxy. Restricting network exposure is important because the default read-only setting does not prevent exploitation.