CVE-2026-130153: Front-Channel Parameter Handling in Okta Client SDK for Python
The Okta Client SDK for Python (okta-client-python) includes client authentication values (clientsecret or JWT assertions) as query parameters in the front-channel authorization URL when executing the authorization code flow without Pushed Authorization Requests (PAR). When PAR is disabled, unsupported by the authorization server, or fails, the SDK falls back to standard authorization URL construction, transmitting these parameters via user-agent requests.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
okta-client-pythonto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 0.3.1 - Operational
Rotate the client secret for any application that has run the authorization code flow without PAR.
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which deployments are exposed to this issue?
Deployments using the Okta Client SDK for Python authorization code flow are exposed when PAR is disabled, unsupported by the authorization server, or fails and the SDK falls back to standard authorization URL construction.
What must occur for sensitive authentication values to be exposed?
A user-agent must make the front-channel authorization request after the SDK constructs the fallback authorization URL. In that path, client_secret values or JWT assertions are included as query parameters.
What can be done if an update cannot be applied immediately?
Avoid the fallback path by ensuring Pushed Authorization Requests are enabled and supported by the authorization server, and address PAR failures rather than allowing standard authorization URL construction.
How can teams determine whether they may have been affected?
Review authorization-code-flow behavior for cases where PAR was disabled, unsupported, or failed. Check resulting user-agent authorization URLs for client_secret or JWT assertion values in query parameters.