CVE-2026-130154: Zyrabit Platform: Path traversal in import_to_vault allows arbitrary file write and read via unvalidated destination_name/source_path
Zyrabit Platform provides sovereign AI infrastructure for enterprise retrieval-augmented generation. Prior to 2.4.4, importtovault(sourcepath, destinationname) accepts both caller-controlled paths, but the content-pattern guard does not confine destinationname. The vulnerable tool is implemented in zyrabit-slm/api-rag/app/domain/services/mcpservice.py, where Path(DOCSDIR) / destinationname is passed to shutil.copy2, allowing traversal or an absolute destination to write outside the vault. An unrestricted sourcepath can be copied into the vault and retrieved through securequery, disclosing files readable by the service; files that do not match the executable-pattern filter pass that filter. When ENABLELEGACYEXTENSIONS=true, zyrabit-slm/api-rag/app/main.py registers POST /mcp/rpc without getcurrentuser, allowing unauthenticated network tool calls; this optional exposure is disabled by default and is not required for local invocation. If an attacker can stage chosen source content and write to an execution-triggered destination, the advisory describes conditional process execution. This issue is fixed in version 2.4.4.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade to a fixed release to a version that resolves this vulnerability.
Fixed in 2.4.4 - Configuration
Set ENABLE_LEGACY_EXTENSIONS=false to keep the optional unauthenticated POST /mcp/rpc endpoint disabled.
Zyrabit Platform ENABLE_LEGACY_EXTENSIONS = false
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Are default deployments exposed to unauthenticated network exploitation?
The unauthenticated POST /mcp/rpc endpoint is only registered when ENABLE_LEGACY_EXTENSIONS=true. This optional exposure is disabled by default, although the vulnerable tool can still be invoked locally.
What access does an attacker need to read or write files?
An attacker needs a way to invoke import_to_vault with caller-controlled source_path and destination_name values. With legacy extensions enabled, the advisory states that network tool calls can be made without authentication; otherwise, local invocation is sufficient.
What are the practical impact limits of the file-read and file-write behavior?
Files readable by the service can be copied into the vault and retrieved through secure_query, provided they pass the executable-pattern filter. Destination path traversal or an absolute path can write outside the vault; process execution is conditional on the attacker staging chosen content and writing it to a location that triggers execution.
What version resolves the issue?
Upgrade Zyrabit Platform to version 2.4.4. The issue affects versions prior to 2.4.4.