CVE-2026-132642: MISP Tag Endpoints Bypass ACL Visibility, Allowing Unauthorized Tag Modification and Enumeration on Hidden Events
MISP contains an access control flaw in its tag management endpoints: events/addTag (single and bulk), events/removeTag, and attributes/removeTag. These endpoints loaded their target event or attribute using an unscoped database query (recursive = -1) that did not apply the calling user's ACL visibility rules. As a result, two distinct security issues existed: (1) Information disclosure: the removeTag endpoint returned different responses depending on whether a given tag was present on a hidden event, allowing an authenticated user to enumerate which tags were applied to events they had no visibility into. (2) Unauthorized modification: users belonging to the host organisation, who are permitted to set local tags on records they can see, could add or remove local tags on events and attributes they could not see, because the canModifyTag ACL check operated on the unscoped object without first verifying the caller's visibility. The fix replaces the unscoped find() calls with ACL-aware fetch methods (fetchSimpleEvent and fetchAttributeSimple) that apply the user's visibility before the object is returned, and adds an explicit empty-object check in removeTag so that a hidden event responds identically to a non-existent one. Affected components include the EventsController (addTag, removeTag), the AttributesController (removeTag), and the ACLComponent (canModifyTag). The vulnerability requires an authenticated user with at least the tagger role (permtagger) or host-organisation membership.
Affected Software
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which users can exploit the unauthorized tag modification issue?
The modification issue requires an authenticated user who belongs to the host organisation. Such a user must have permission to set local tags on records they can normally see; the flaw allowed tag operations on hidden events and attributes because visibility was not verified first.
What information can be disclosed through the tag endpoints?
An authenticated user could use differing removeTag responses to determine whether a specified tag was applied to an event that the user was not permitted to view. This permits enumeration of tags on hidden events.
Which operations are affected?
The affected endpoints are events/addTag, including its single and bulk use, events/removeTag, and attributes/removeTag. The disclosure behavior is described for removeTag, while unauthorized local-tag changes affect hidden events and attributes.
How does the fix prevent this issue?
The fix replaces unscoped database lookups with ACL-aware fetchSimpleEvent and fetchAttributeSimple methods, so visibility is applied before the target object is returned. It also adds an empty-object check in removeTag for hidden events.