CVE-2026-133163: Medium severity vulnerability
MISP contains an authorization bypass affecting the event protection mechanism. In MISP, a protected event is designed to be modifiable only through the events/edit endpoint with a valid cryptographic signature. However, the protection check was enforced solely on that single route. All other write endpoints that operate on an event—attributes (add, edit, delete), objects (delete), events (populate, publish, unprotect, uploadsample, uploadanalysisfile), tags (attach, detach), event reports (edit, delete), galaxy clusters (attach, detach), and cryptographic keys (add, delete)—lacked the equivalent check.
As a result, an authenticated user holding the sync permission (permsync) who is neither a site administrator nor an internal sync user (permsyncinternal), and who belongs to the same organization as the event's creator (orgcid), could modify, delete, or add data to a protected event without providing a valid signature. This included the ability to unprotect the event entirely, publish it to other instances, and add cryptographic signing keys that would subsequently permit signed edits, effectively nullifying the protection mechanism.
The vulnerability requires an authenticated sync user account within the event's creator organization. No user interaction or special network conditions are required; standard API calls to the affected endpoints are sufficient. The security impact is a loss of integrity over protected threat-intelligence events: an attacker can inject, alter, or remove attributes, objects, tags, reports, and galaxy cluster associations, and can remove the protection flag or add signing keys to enable persistent unauthorized modification.
Remediation
Information
Frequently Asked Questions
Which users are able to bypass the protection controls?
The affected users are authenticated users with perm_sync who are not site administrators and do not have perm_sync_internal. They must also belong to the same organization as the protected event's creator, identified by orgc_id.
What actions should be reviewed for potentially unauthorized changes?
Review changes to protected events made through write operations other than events/edit, including attribute, object, tag, event report, galaxy cluster, and cryptographic key changes. Also review whether protected events were unprotected or published to other instances.
What can be restricted while the fix is being deployed?
Prioritize restricting perm_sync for non-internal, non-site-admin users in organizations that create protected events. Those are the accounts described as able to modify protected events without a valid signature through the unprotected write routes.
Does a valid signature still protect the events/edit route?
The described protection mechanism requires a valid cryptographic signature for modifications through events/edit. The bypass affected the other event write endpoints where the equivalent protection check was absent.