CVE-2026-133224: Org.keycloak:keycloak-services: pre-revocation id tokens can mint fresh uma rpts after realm not-before

Published Nov 19, 2026
·
Updated

A flaw was found in Keycloak. When an administrator revokes tokens by setting a not-before revocation cutoff, Keycloak fails to enforce this boundary when processing User-Managed Access (UMA) grant requests using ID token claims. An authenticated remote user with an active session can submit a previously revoked ID token to receive a fresh Requesting Party Token (RPT). This flaw allows an attacker to bypass token revocation and retain unauthorized access to protected resources.

Other sources

When an administrator revokes existing tokens by raising the realm (or

client/user) not-before value, ID tokens issued before that cutoff are still accepted by the UMA grant when they are submitted as a claim token in the ID token format. Keycloak verifies the signature, client and expiration of the ID token but does not enforce the not-before revocation boundary. As long as the user's session is still active, Keycloak builds a new identity from it and issues a fresh Requesting Party Token (RPT) carrying the evaluated authorization permissions. This defeats the administrator's explicit token revocation. The affected endpoint is the token endpoint (POST /realms/{realm}/protocol/openid-connect/token) using the UMA grant (urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:uma-ticket) with claimtokenformat set to the ID token format.

— Red Hat

Affected Software

0 affected components

Frequently Asked Questions

1

Who is exposed to this issue?

Keycloak deployments using UMA authorization are exposed when a user can submit an ID token as a claim token to the realm token endpoint. The user must still have an active session, even if the ID token was issued before the administrator's not-before revocation cutoff.

2

What does an attacker need to exploit it?

An attacker needs authenticated access, a previously issued ID token that remains otherwise valid for signature, client, and expiration checks, and an active user session. They can submit the token in an UMA grant request to POST /realms/{realm}/protocol/openid-connect/token to obtain a fresh RPT.

3

Does raising the realm, client, or user not-before value prevent this activity?

No. For the affected UMA flow using an ID token claim token, Keycloak does not enforce the applicable not-before revocation boundary, so an ID token issued before the cutoff can still be used to mint a new RPT while the session remains active.

4

How can an administrator tell whether revocation has been bypassed?

Review UMA grant activity at the realm token endpoint for RPTs issued after a not-before value was raised, where the claim token is an ID token issued before that cutoff. The condition is relevant when the corresponding user session was still active.

Contact

SecAlerts Pty Ltd.
132 Wickham Terrace
Fortitude Valley,
QLD 4006, Australia
info@secalerts.co
By using SecAlerts services, you agree to our services end-user license agreement. This website is safeguarded by reCAPTCHA and governed by the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service. All names, logos, and brands of products are owned by their respective owners, and any usage of these names, logos, and brands for identification purposes only does not imply endorsement. If you possess any content that requires removal, please get in touch with us.
© 2026 SecAlerts Pty Ltd.
ABN: 70 645 966 203, ACN: 645 966 203