CVE-2026-133228: Org.keycloak.services.resources: client minimum acr (level of authentication) is not enforced when the login starts at the credential reset endpoint, allowing a second factor bypass
A client can enforce a minimum authentication level (the "Minimum ACR
Value" client setting, documented as the server-side way to enforce step-up authentication). The normal authorization endpoint applies that minimum, so the second factor is demanded. The credential reset endpoint (/realms/{realm}/login-actions/reset-credentials?clientid=...&redirecturi=...) also creates a login session for a client. That session never receives the client's required level. A user who starts the login there and follows the "Back to login" link gets the same login form. Because no level is required, the conditional second-factor subflow is skipped and the login completes with the first factor only. Keycloak then issues an authorization code, and the client can redeem it for an access token and a refresh token. The token carries the level the first factor reached (acr=1).
The same defect was fixed for the Device Authorization Grant and CIBA in 26.8.2 (CVE-2026-105305). This is a further entry point with the same missing step. The same omission exists when a login is continued from an action token link (password reset, verify email or execute-actions email), but that path needs a valid action token and is narrower.
Against the built-in administration console, whose minimum ACR is set to a second-factor level, an attacker who knows only an administrator's password obtains a token that works against the Admin API. This also relies on the missing PKCE enforcement at the token endpoint on the same entry point, which is tracked separately in keycloak/keycloak#55064.
Other sources
A flaw was found in Keycloak. When a client application enforces step-up authentication or multi-factor authentication (MFA) via a minimum authentication level, Keycloak fails to apply this requirement to login sessions initiated through the credential reset endpoint. An attacker who possesses a user's initial credentials (such as a password) can navigate from the reset interface back to the standard login form and authenticate without completing the required second factor. This flaw allows an attacker to obtain valid access tokens and gain unauthorized access to protected services without satisfying mandatory security controls.
— MITRE
Affected Software
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which deployments are exposed to this bypass?
Clients that use the Minimum ACR Value setting to require step-up authentication are affected when their authentication flow conditionally requires a second factor. The normal authorization endpoint enforces the setting, but the credential-reset entry point does not apply the required level to the login session.
What does an attacker need to do to exploit the issue?
The attacker can start a login through the credential-reset endpoint with a client_id and redirect_uri, then use the Back to login link to reach the login form. That flow can complete after the first factor because the conditional second-factor subflow is skipped; the supplied vector indicates user interaction is required.
What evidence indicates that the bypass succeeded?
Keycloak issues an authorization code that the client can redeem for access and refresh tokens despite the configured minimum authentication level. The resulting token carries the authentication level reached by the first factor, such as acr=1.
Are action-token-based login continuations also affected?
Yes. Logins continued from password-reset, verify-email, or execute-actions email links have the same omission, but exploiting those paths requires a valid action token.