CVE-2026-133536: Org.keycloak:keycloak-services: post-logout redirect uri configuration of a disabled client is still honored, leading to open redirect
A flaw was found in Keycloak. The OpenID Connect (OIDC) logout endpoint continues to honor post-logout redirect rules for disabled clients rather than rejecting the requests. If a disabled client retains permissive redirect configurations, a remote attacker can exploit this issue by supplying an arbitrary redirection target in a logout request, leading to an open redirect that can be used in phishing attacks.
Other sources
The OpenID Connect logout endpoint (GET
/realms/{realm}/protocol/openid-connect/logout) still applies a client's post-logout redirect URI configuration after the client has been disabled. A disabled client should be rejected with an error, as the authorization endpoint does, and its redirect allowlist should be ignored. Instead, if a disabled client was configured with a permissive post-logout redirect URI (for example "", or a redirect URI of "" with an empty post-logout redirect URI), a request for the logout endpoint with that clientid and an arbitrary postlogoutredirecturi redirects the browser to the attacker-chosen URL. When the victim has an active session, Keycloak shows the logout confirmation page first. When the victim has no active session, the browser is redirected directly, which results in an open redirect. Disabling a misconfigured client is expected to neutralize the issue, and it does not. The same behavior was confirmed on a build of main, where the redirect is also honored after the user confirms the logout.
— Red Hat
Affected Software
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which deployments are exposed to this open redirect?
Deployments are exposed when they have a disabled client whose post-logout redirect configuration is permissive, such as a wildcard "*". The issue affects the OIDC logout endpoint for requests that reference that disabled client.
What does an attacker need to exploit the issue?
An attacker needs the client_id of a disabled client with a permissive post-logout redirect configuration and can submit a logout request containing an attacker-chosen post_logout_redirect_uri. No authentication is required, although a victim with an active Keycloak session will first see a logout confirmation page.
What should be done if an update cannot be applied immediately?
Review disabled clients and remove permissive post-logout redirect configurations, particularly wildcard entries. Disabled clients should not retain redirect allowlists that permit arbitrary destinations.
How can administrators identify potentially affected clients?
Identify clients that are disabled and inspect their post-logout redirect URI settings. Clients configured with "*", or with a redirect URI of "*" and an empty post-logout redirect URI, can allow redirection to an arbitrary URL through the logout endpoint.