CVE-2026-133537: Org.keycloak:keycloak-services: org.keycloak:keycloak-common: uma uri suffix matching authorization bypass
A flaw was found in Keycloak. When evaluating access permissions, Keycloak Authorization Services improperly matches resource paths containing wildcard file extensions by evaluating only the file extension suffix and ignoring configured path prefixes. An authenticated remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability by requesting a restricted resource that shares a file extension with a more permissive resource, leading to an authorization bypass and unintended access to protected data.
Other sources
Keycloak Authorization Services can resolve a requested URI to an
unrelated protected resource when that resource uses an extension suffix wildcard pattern such as /public/.json. The URI matcher compares the request only against the file extension suffix (e.g., .json), omitting the configured path prefix (e.g., /public/). A suffix match is also retained and preferred over a normal trailing-wildcard candidate. Consequently, a UMA permission request for /admin/secret.json can match against the /public/.json resource and receive its grant policy instead of the deny policy attached to /admin/. When using responsemode=decision, the authorization endpoint returns a positive decision for the denied URI, defeating resource-level authorization for affected configurations.
— Red Hat
Affected Software
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which deployments are exposed to this issue?
Deployments using Keycloak Authorization Services with URI-based resources that use extension-suffix wildcards, such as /public/*.json, are exposed when protected paths elsewhere use the same extension. The risk is greatest where more permissive and restrictive policies apply to different paths sharing a file extension.
What does an attacker need to exploit it?
An attacker needs an authenticated remote account with the ability to make UMA permission or authorization requests. They can request a restricted URI such as /admin/secret.json and potentially receive the policy grant associated with a permissive resource such as /public/*.json.
How can administrators check whether their authorization policies are affected?
Review Authorization Services resources for wildcard patterns that match file extensions and compare them with restricted URI paths using the same extensions. A test UMA request for a restricted path with response_mode=decision returning a positive decision where the restrictive policy should deny access indicates exposure.