CVE-2026-133553: Crun: crun: tmpcopyup follows a second path lookup and copies image files onto the host

Published Nov 20, 2026
·
Updated

A flaw was found in crun. For a tmpfs mount with tmpcopyup, processsinglemount() opens the destination and attaches the tmpfs, and handletmpcopyup() then opens that destination again by name without ONOFOLLOW and copies the image files there. A container that shares a writable volume with the container being created can rename a path component to a symlink between the two lookups, so crun, running as host root, writes the image files onto host files. Those files include /proc/sys and files on a volume mounted read-only in another container. The copy keeps the source owner and mode, including the set-user-ID bit. The same second lookup by name is used for the recursive mount options rro, rnosuid, rnodev, and rnoexec. The lookup was added in commit 1fac50d, crun 0.9. Releases through 1.30.1 are affected, and current upstream main still has the open.

Other sources

A flaw was found in crun. When copying files onto a tmpfs mounted with tmpcopyup, crun opens the destination a second time by name. A container that shares a writable volume with the container being created can change that path between the two lookups, so crun copies image files onto host files, including files under /proc/sys.

— MITRE

Affected Software

0 affected components

Frequently Asked Questions

1

Which environments are exposed to exploitation?

Exploitation requires a container that shares a writable volume with the container being created. The attacker must be able to rename a path component on that shared volume to a symlink during crun's two destination lookups.

2

What level of access does an attacker need?

The vector is local and requires low privileges. No user interaction is required, but the attacker needs control of a container with the required shared writable volume and must win the timing window between the lookups.

3

What is the potential impact if exploitation succeeds?

Because crun runs as host root, it can be redirected into copying image files onto host files. The copied files retain source ownership and mode, including set-user-ID bits, and targets can include files under /proc/sys or files on a volume mounted read-only in another container.

4

Are recursive mount options also affected?

Yes. The same second pathname lookup is used for the recursive mount options rro, rnosuid, rnodev, and rnoexec, so configurations using those options are also exposed to the path-race issue.

5

Which crun versions are known to be affected?

The vulnerable lookup was introduced in commit 1fac50d, released in crun 0.9. Releases through 1.30.1 are affected, and the issue is also present in current upstream main.

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