CVE-2026-133611: vulnerability-lookup: 2FA Disabled via Unauthenticated GET Request and Unpublished Comments Accessible Without Authorization
vulnerability-lookup prior to version 7.1.0 contains two security issues in its web interface. First, the /user/toggle2fa endpoint accepted HTTP GET requests and disabled the authenticated user's two-factor authentication without requiring password confirmation. Because the state-changing operation was reachable via GET, an attacker with a basic account could embed an image element (or any other GET-triggering markup) in a comment pointing to that endpoint. When a victim with 2FA enabled viewed the comment, their browser silently issued the GET request, disabling the victim's second factor of authentication. No CSRF token was enforced on the GET path, and no password was required to confirm the action. Second, the comment detail page (/comment/<uuid>) rendered unpublished comments to any visitor who possessed the URL, bypassing the moderation workflow that was intended to keep such content hidden until approved. The API correctly restricted access, but the web view did not enforce the same authorization check. The combined effect allows an attacker to degrade a victim's account security (removal of 2FA) through a single page view and to read content that was not yet approved for public release.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
vulnerability-lookupto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 7.1.0
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which deployments are affected?
Deployments of vulnerability-lookup before version 7.1.0 are affected. The issues are in the web interface: the 2FA toggle endpoint and the browser-rendered comment detail page.
What does an attacker need to disable another user's 2FA?
The attacker needs a basic account that can post or otherwise place GET-triggering markup in a comment, and the target must have 2FA enabled and view that content while authenticated. No CSRF token or password confirmation was required for the affected GET request.
Who can view an unpublished comment under the affected behavior?
Any visitor possessing the unpublished comment's detail URL could view it through the web page. This did not require authorization, although the API correctly restricted access.
How can I check whether I am exposed?
Confirm whether the deployed version is earlier than 7.1.0. In an affected installation, test whether an authenticated GET request to /user/toggle_2fa disables 2FA without CSRF validation or password confirmation, and whether an unauthenticated visitor can open /comment/<uuid> for an unpublished comment.