CVE-2026-133622: Certmonger: missing size limits and timeouts in scep ca reply handling lead to denial of service
A flaw was found in certmonger. This vulnerability allows a malicious certificate authority or an attacker positioned on an unencrypted network to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) by sending oversized or deliberately slow responses. Certmonger fails to enforce size limits or transfer timeouts when downloading and buffering Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol (SCEP) replies over HTTP. Consequently, an attacker can exhaust host memory, drive CPU usage to capacity, or cause certificate requests to hang indefinitely.
Other sources
A flaw was found in certmonger's SCEP handling. Certificate authority replies fetched over HTTP are buffered in full before any validation, with no size limit or transfer timeout on the download, and the daemon likewise reads submit helper output into a buffer without a cap. A malicious or compromised certificate authority, or a man-in-the-middle on a plaintext SCEP channel, can use this to consume memory on the host running the certmonger daemon (per-buffer growth is bounded at the talloc allocator's 256 MiB maximum, but the data is held in several copies at once across the helper, the daemon, and its postprocessing child), to leave certificate requests permanently stuck with a pinned CPU core once the daemon-side buffer cap is reached, and to hang requests indefinitely by serving replies slowly. The impact is availability only.
— Red Hat
Affected Software
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which deployments are exposed to this denial-of-service condition?
Hosts running the certmonger daemon that retrieve SCEP certificate authority replies over HTTP are exposed. The threat is most direct when the configured CA is malicious or compromised, or when SCEP uses an unencrypted network path where an attacker can modify replies.
Does exploitation require credentials or user interaction?
No privileges or user interaction are required according to the supplied vector. However, exploitation requires control of the CA response or a man-in-the-middle position on a plaintext SCEP connection, and the attack complexity is rated high.
What operational effects could indicate exploitation?
Certificate requests may hang indefinitely, while host memory consumption or CPU use can rise substantially. Oversized replies are buffered before validation; individual talloc allocations are bounded at 256 MiB, but response data can exist in multiple copies across the helper, daemon, and postprocessing child.