CVE-2026-133652: Flowintel Session Identifiers Not Bound to Credentials Allow Persistent Access After Password Change
Flowintel , contained a session management vulnerability in its browser authentication mechanism. The session identifier used a bare numeric user ID rather than a credential-bound token, resulting in several related weaknesses:
- Remembered logins (remember-me cookies) remained valid after a user changed their password, allowing an attacker holding a previously issued cookie to retain access indefinitely. - Server-side session identifiers were not rotated upon login (local, SSO, or remembered), enabling session fixation. - Self-service email and password changes did not require verification of the current password, permitting an attacker with an active session to modify account credentials without knowledge of the existing password. - Administrator-initiated password resets did not revoke other browser sessions, invalidate remembered logins, or rotate the affected user's API key.
An attacker who obtained a valid session or remember-me cookie (e.g., through XSS, network interception, or cookie theft) could maintain unauthorized access even after the legitimate user changed their password. Additionally, an attacker with any valid session could change the account's email address or password without knowing the current credentials, effectively taking over the account.
Affected versions: Flowintel prior to 4.1.0.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade to a fixed release to a version that resolves this vulnerability.
Fixed in 4.1.0
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
What access must an attacker obtain before they can retain control of an account?
The attacker needs a valid browser session or remember-me cookie. Such material could be obtained through XSS, network interception, or cookie theft; once obtained, it can remain usable after the legitimate user changes their password.
Does changing a user's password terminate an attacker's existing access?
No. Remembered logins remain valid after a password change, and administrator-initiated password resets do not revoke other browser sessions, invalidate remembered logins, or rotate the affected user's API key.
What can an attacker do with an active authenticated session?
An attacker with an active session can change the account email address or password without providing the current password. Session identifiers also are not rotated during local login, SSO login, or remembered login, allowing session-fixation attacks.