CVE-2026-15707: Netskope Client and Endpoint DLP Local Privilege Escalation via Insecure OpenSSL Configuration
An uncontrolled search path vulnerability (CWE-427) in statically linked OpenSSL libraries within Netskope Client (stAgentSvc.exe) and Endpoint DLP (epdlp.exe) on Windows allows an authenticated local attacker to execute arbitrary code with elevated SYSTEM privileges. The services retain internal build-time paths referencing a secondary drive location. On Windows systems where default volume permissions allow standard users to create root-level directories on secondary drives, an attacker can place a malicious configuration file (openssl.cnf) that is loaded under the NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM context upon service startup or system reboot. Under default operating system permissions, macOS and Linux are not susceptible, and mobile platforms are unaffected.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
Netskope Client and Endpoint DLPto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in R142.0.0 - Upgrade
Upgrade
Netskope Client and Endpoint DLPto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 141.1.13.2833 - Upgrade
Upgrade
Netskope Client and Endpoint DLPto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 138.1.16.2834 - Upgrade
Upgrade
Netskope Client and Endpoint DLPto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 135.1.27.2835
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which systems are exposed to this issue?
Windows systems running the affected Netskope Client or Endpoint DLP services may be exposed when a secondary drive permits standard users to create directories at its root. macOS and Linux are not susceptible under default operating system permissions, and mobile platforms are unaffected.
What does an attacker need to exploit it?
An attacker needs authenticated local access to the Windows system and the ability to create the relevant root-level directory on a secondary drive. They can place a malicious openssl.cnf file there, which is loaded as SYSTEM when the affected service starts or the system reboots.
When would exploitation take effect?
The malicious configuration is loaded upon affected service startup or during a system reboot. Successful exploitation results in arbitrary code execution with NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM privileges.
What can be done if patching cannot be performed immediately?
Restrict standard users from creating root-level directories on secondary drives, since this condition enables placement of the malicious configuration file. Review secondary-drive volume permissions on Windows hosts running the affected services.