CVE-2026-17507: MLS membership checks compare a uint32 leaf_index as signed, admitting an out-of-range sender

Published Oct 2, 2026
·
Updated

In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, the MLS implementation (org.bouncycastle.mls) holds RFC 9420's uint32 leafindex in a signed int, so a wire value with the top bit set decodes to a negative number. That is a legitimate encoding rather than malformed input, and it must still decode, since the MLS interop test vectors round-trip the full range. GroupKeySet.SecretTree.hasLeaf and Group.validateRemove compared the decoded value directly against the tree's leaf count, and a signed comparison treats any negative int as less than a positive bound, so an out-of-range sender passed the membership check. In the hasLeaf case the SenderData of an unprotected PrivateMessage could then drive LeafIndex.directPath through NodeIndex.parent() arithmetic that never reaches the tree root, growing the resulting node list without bound until the JVM exhausted its heap. A single small message from any current group member could therefore deny service to every other member of the group. Both comparisons now interpret the value as unsigned via Integer.toUnsignedLong, rejecting an out-of-range sender however it was encoded; well-formed leaf indices are unaffected.

Affected Software

2 affected components
Bouncy Castle Bouncy Castle for Java<1.86
bouncycastle bc-java>=1.73<1.86

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Upgrade

    Upgrade Bouncy Castle for Java to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 1.86

Event History

Oct 2, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·07:26 AM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·07:26 AM
DescriptionWeakness
Data Sourced
via OSV·07:26 AM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness
Data Sourced
via NVD·08:17 AM
RemedyDescriptionSeverityWeaknessAffected Software

Frequently Asked Questions

1

Who can exploit this issue?

A current member of an affected MLS group can exploit it by sending a single small unprotected PrivateMessage with crafted SenderData. No prior privileges beyond group membership are described.

2

What is the practical impact of a successful exploit?

The crafted out-of-range sender value can cause unbounded growth of a node list during direct-path processing until the JVM exhausts heap memory. This can deny service to every other member of the MLS group.

3

Are valid MLS messages or full-range leaf-index encodings rejected by the fix?

No. The fix treats leaf indices as unsigned when checking bounds, rejecting only out-of-range senders regardless of encoding. Well-formed leaf indices remain unaffected, including legitimate wire encodings with the top bit set.

4

How is the issue fixed?

The affected membership checks in GroupKeySet.SecretTree.hasLeaf and Group.validateRemove were changed to interpret decoded leaf indices as unsigned using Integer.toUnsignedLong before comparing them with the tree leaf count.

Contact

SecAlerts Pty Ltd.
132 Wickham Terrace
Fortitude Valley,
QLD 4006, Australia
info@secalerts.co
By using SecAlerts services, you agree to our services end-user license agreement. This website is safeguarded by reCAPTCHA and governed by the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service. All names, logos, and brands of products are owned by their respective owners, and any usage of these names, logos, and brands for identification purposes only does not imply endorsement. If you possess any content that requires removal, please get in touch with us.
© 2026 SecAlerts Pty Ltd.
ABN: 70 645 966 203, ACN: 645 966 203