CVE-2026-19548: Binutils: binutils: multiple use-after-free in add_archive_element via lto plugin processing

This is a vulnerability report sent to us through https://issues.redhat.com/browse/PSIRTSUPT-17918 and was created using the PoC auto-triage agents. It contains hints on the vulnerability extracted by the IA and the full report. ALWAYS review it before any action. Once working on this, don't forget to also update the JSM ticket.

Multiple Use-After-Free vulnerabilities were found in the addarchiveelement function in ld/ldmain.c of the GNU linker (ld), a component of binutils. The root cause is that pluginmaybeclaim() in ld/plugin.c frees the original BFD object via bfdclose/bfddeletebfd when entry->thebfd->myarchive == NULL, but the caller retains both the original abfd parameter and a shallow copy (originput.thebfd) as dangling pointers. These dangling pointers are subsequently dereferenced at three distinct locations in addarchiveelement:

1. Line ~1442: accessing abfd->myarchive via bfdusrdata(abfd->myarchive) 2. Line ~1493: multiple accesses to abfd and abfd->myarchive in a conditional check and bfdgetfilename call 3. Line ~1525: dereferencing the shallow copy originput.thebfd->myarchive in trace/verbose logging

The vulnerability is triggered when LTO plugins are active (linkinfo.ltopluginactive is true) and the input object has abfd->myarchive == NULL, which is a valid state for standalone object files. Red Hat builds binutils with --enable-plugins and --enable-lto, confirming the vulnerable code path is compiled in and reachable.

An attacker who can supply a crafted object or archive file to a build process using LTO-enabled linking could exploit this flaw to cause a denial of service (linker crash via segmentation fault). Arbitrary code execution is theoretically possible through heap manipulation but is substantially mitigated by hardening measures including stack protector, FORTIFYSOURCE, ASLR, and PIE.

The attack surface is limited to build-time environments — the linker is a development tool not exposed in production runtime. The most realistic exploitation scenario is a supply chain attack introducing a crafted object file as a build dependency in CI/CD pipelines or development environments.