CVE-2026-23467: drm/i915/dmc: Fix an unlikely NULL pointer deference at probe
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/i915/dmc: Fix an unlikely NULL pointer deference at probe
inteldmcupdatedc6allowedcount() oopses when DMC hasn't been initialized, and dmc is thus NULL.
That would be the case when the call path is intelpowerdomainsinithw() -> {skl,bxt,icl}displaycoreinit() -> gen9setdcstate() -> inteldmcupdatedc6allowedcount(), as intelpowerdomainsinithw() is called before inteldmcinit().
However, gen9setdcstate() calls inteldmcupdatedc6allowedcount() conditionally, depending on the current and target DC states. At probe, the target is disabled, but if DC6 is enabled, the function is called, and an oops follows. Apparently it's quite unlikely that DC6 is enabled at probe, as we haven't seen this failure mode before.
It is also strange to have DC6 enabled at boot, since that would require the DMC firmware (loaded by BIOS); the BIOS loading the DMC firmware and the driver stopping / reprogramming the firmware is a poorly specified sequence and as such unlikely an intentional BIOS behaviour. It's more likely that BIOS is leaving an unintentionally enabled DC6 HW state behind (without actually loading the required DMC firmware for this).
The tracking of the DC6 allowed counter only works if starting / stopping the counter depends on the SW DC6 state vs. the current HW DC6 state (since stopping the counter requires the DC5 counter captured when the counter was started). Thus, using the HW DC6 state is incorrect and it also leads to the above oops. Fix both issues by using the SW DC6 state for the tracking.
This is v2 of the fix originally sent by Jani, updated based on the first Link: discussion below.
(cherry picked from commit 2344b93af8eb5da5d496b4e0529d35f0f559eaf0)
Affected Software
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
What systems are realistically exposed to this issue?
Systems using the Linux i915 graphics driver on Intel display platforms that follow the affected Gen9 display-core initialization paths are exposed only if DC6 is already enabled during driver probe. The issue is described as unlikely because DC6 being enabled at boot is not expected behavior.
What condition triggers the crash?
The crash occurs during driver probe when intel_power_domains_init_hw() runs before intel_dmc_init(), leaving the DMC pointer NULL, and the current hardware state has DC6 enabled. A conditional call to intel_dmc_update_dc6_allowed_count() then dereferences that NULL pointer, causing an oops.
Does exploitation require remote access or user interaction?
No. The CVSS vector identifies local access, low attack complexity, low privileges, and no user interaction. The described impact is availability loss through a kernel oops during initialization.
What can be done if the kernel fix cannot be applied immediately?
The provided information identifies the triggering condition as DC6 being enabled at probe, potentially because firmware or BIOS left that hardware state enabled. No specific supported workaround or configuration change is provided.