CVE-2026-32637: Path Traversal
Impact What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted? If the attacker compromises the backup's object storage backend and uploads a malicious backup tarball including file names like the following: ../../../tmp/escape1 -> file created at /tmp/escape1 ../../../../../../../../tmp/escape2 -> file created at /tmp/escape2 ../../../tmp/cronpoc -> would be /etc/cron.d/backdoor in real attack ../../../tmp/sshpoc -> would be ~/.ssh/authorizedkeys ../../../tmp/kubeconfigpoc -> would be ~/.kube/config
It's possible that extracting files from the tarball during restore can overwrite sensitive files in the Velero pod filesystem.
Patches Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?
By far, there is no patch yet. We are working on the main branch, then cherry-pick to the release-1.18 for v1.18.1 patch.
Workarounds Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?
There is no workaround, but the good news is that keeping your OSS safe will prevent the vulnerability.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
go/github.com/vmware-tanzu/veleroto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 1.18.1
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Who is realistically exposed to exploitation?
Deployments are exposed if an attacker can compromise the object storage backend used for backups and upload a malicious backup tarball. The issue is triggered when that tarball is extracted during a restore operation.
What can a malicious backup archive do during restore?
Path traversal file names in the archive can cause extraction to overwrite sensitive files in the Velero pod filesystem. The advisory gives examples affecting locations such as /tmp, cron configuration, SSH authorized keys, and kubeconfig files.
Is a patch available, and what should be done until then?
No patch is available yet. Work is underway for the main branch and a planned v1.18.1 release; there is no workaround, so protecting the backup object storage backend is the stated mitigation.