CVE-2026-34785: Rack: Local file inclusion in `Rack::Static` via URL Prefix Matching

Published Apr 2, 2026
·
Updated

Summary

Rack::Static determines whether a request should be served as a static file using a simple string prefix check. When configured with URL prefixes such as "/css", it matches any request path that begins with that string, including unrelated paths such as "/css-config.env" or "/css-backup.sql".

As a result, files under the static root whose names merely share the configured prefix may be served unintentionally, leading to information disclosure.

Details

Rack::Static#routefile performs static-route matching using logic equivalent to:

ruby @urls.any? { |url| path.index(url) == 0 }

This checks only whether the request path starts with the configured prefix string. It does not require a path segment boundary after the prefix.

For example, with:

ruby use Rack::Static, urls: ["/css", "/js"], root: "public"

the following path is matched as intended:

text /css/style.css

but these paths are also matched:

text /css-config.env /css-backup.sql /csssecrets.yml

If such files exist under the configured static root, Rack forwards the request to the file server and serves them as static content.

This means a configuration intended to expose only directory trees such as /css/... and /js/... may also expose sibling files whose names begin with those same strings.

Impact

An attacker can request files under the configured static root whose names share a configured URL prefix and obtain their contents.

In affected deployments, this may expose configuration files, secrets, backups, environment files, or other unintended static content located under the same root directory.

Mitigation

Update to a patched version of Rack that enforces a path boundary when matching configured static URL prefixes. Match only paths that are either exactly equal to the configured prefix or begin with prefix + "/". Avoid placing sensitive files under the Rack::Static root directory. Prefer static URL mappings that cannot overlap with sensitive filenames.

Other sources

Rack is a modular Ruby web server interface. Prior to versions 2.2.23, 3.1.21, and 3.2.6, Rack::Static determines whether a request should be served as a static file using a simple string prefix check. When configured with URL prefixes such as "/css", it matches any request path that begins with that string, including unrelated paths such as "/css-config.env" or "/css-backup.sql". As a result, files under the static root whose names merely share the configured prefix may be served unintentionally, leading to information disclosure. This issue has been patched in versions 2.2.23, 3.1.21, and 3.2.6.

MITRE

Affected Software

6 affected componentsFixes available
rubygems/rack>=3.2.0<3.2.6
3.2.6
rubygems/rack>=3.0.0.beta1<3.1.21
3.1.21
rubygems/rack<2.2.23
2.2.23
Rack Rack Ruby<2.2.23
Rack Rack Ruby>=3.0.0<3.1.21
Rack Rack Ruby>=3.2.0<3.2.6

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Upgrade

    Upgrade rubygems/rack to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 3.2.6
  2. Upgrade

    Upgrade rubygems/rack to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 3.1.21
  3. Upgrade

    Upgrade rubygems/rack to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 2.2.23
  4. Upgrade

    Upgrade Rack::Static to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 2.2.23
  5. Upgrade

    Upgrade Rack::Static to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 3.1.21
  6. Upgrade

    Upgrade Rack::Static to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 3.2.6
  7. Configuration

    Configure Rack::Static static URL prefixes so that they match only paths that are exactly equal to the configured prefix or begin with the configured prefix plus a trailing '/' (e.g., match '/css' and '/css/...' but not '/css-config.env' or '/css-backup.sql').

    Rack::Static static URL prefix matching = Match only paths exactly equal to the configured prefix or beginning with prefix + "/" (enforce path boundary)
  8. Configuration

    Move sensitive files (e.g., config/env/secret/backup files such as 'css-config.env', 'csssecrets.yml', and 'css-backup.sql') out of the directory configured as the Rack::Static root.

    Rack::Static static root contents = Do not place sensitive files under the Rack::Static root directory
  9. Compensating control

    Prefer static URL mappings that cannot overlap with sensitive filenames (avoid prefixes like '/css' if sensitive files under the static root include sibling filenames such as '/css-config.env' or '/css-backup.sql').

Event History

Apr 2, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·04:44 PM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·04:44 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness
Data Sourced
via NVD·05:16 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness
Data Sourced
via NVD·05:16 PM
Affected Software
Data Sourced
via Red Hat·06:01 PM
DescriptionSeverityAffected Software
Advisory Published
via GitHub·06:44 PM
Data Sourced
via GitHub·06:44 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeaknessAffected Software

Frequently Asked Questions

1

What is the severity of CVE-2026-34785?

CVE-2026-34785 has a moderate severity rating due to the potential for local file inclusion vulnerabilities.

2

How do I fix CVE-2026-34785?

To fix CVE-2026-34785, upgrade Rack to version 2.2.24, 3.1.22, or 3.2.7 or later.

3

What types of applications are affected by CVE-2026-34785?

CVE-2026-34785 affects applications using vulnerable versions of the Rack framework configured with specific URL prefixes.

4

Is CVE-2026-34785 a remote or local attack vulnerability?

CVE-2026-34785 is categorized as a local file inclusion vulnerability, which requires local access to exploit.

5

What components of Rack are vulnerable in CVE-2026-34785?

CVE-2026-34785 specifically impacts the Rack::Static component of the Rack framework.

Contact

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