CVE-2026-35209: defu: Prototype pollution via `__proto__` key in defaults argument

Published Apr 4, 2026
·
Updated

Impact

Applications that pass unsanitized user input (e.g. parsed JSON request bodies, database records, or config files from untrusted sources) as the first argument to defu() are vulnerable to prototype pollution.

A crafted payload containing a proto key can override intended default values in the merged result:

js import { defu } from 'defu'

const userInput = JSON.parse('{"proto":{"isAdmin":true}}') const config = defu(userInput, { isAdmin: false })

config.isAdmin // true — attacker overrides the server default

Root Cause

The internal defu function used Object.assign({}, defaults) to copy the defaults object. Object.assign invokes the proto setter, which replaces the resulting object's [[Prototype]] with attacker-controlled values. Properties inherited from the polluted prototype then bypass the existing proto key guard in the for...in loop and land in the final result.

Fix

Replace Object.assign({}, defaults) with object spread ({ ...defaults }), which uses [[DefineOwnProperty]] and does not invoke the proto setter.

Affected Versions

<= 6.1.4

Credits

Reported by @BlackHatExploitation

Other sources

defu is software that allows uers to assign default properties recursively. Prior to version 6.1.5, applications that pass unsanitized user input (e.g. parsed JSON request bodies, database records, or config files from untrusted sources) as the first argument to defu() are vulnerable to prototype pollution. A crafted payload containing a proto key can override intended default values in the merged resul. The internal defu function used Object.assign({}, defaults) to copy the defaults object. Object.assign invokes the proto setter, which replaces the resulting object's [[Prototype]] with attacker-controlled values. Properties inherited from the polluted prototype then bypass the existing proto key guard in the for...in loop and land in the final result. Version 6.1.5 replaces Object.assign({}, defaults) with object spread ({ ...defaults }), which uses [[DefineOwnProperty]] and does not invoke the proto setter.

MITRE

Affected Software

3 affected componentsFixes available
npm/defu<=6.1.4
6.1.5
unjs Defu Node.js<6.1.5
IBM Concert Software<=1.0.0-3.0.0

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Upgrade

    Upgrade npm/defu to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 6.1.5
  2. Upgrade

    Upgrade defu to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 6.1.5
  3. Configuration

    If modifying/patching code, replace `Object.assign({}, defaults)` used to copy defaults with object spread (`{ ...defaults }`), which uses `[[DefineOwnProperty]]` and does not invoke the `__proto__` setter.

    defu (internal default merge behavior) defaults merge implementation = Use object spread ({ ...defaults }) instead of Object.assign({}, defaults)
  4. Compensating control

    Ensure any untrusted input used as the first argument to `defu()` (e.g., parsed JSON request bodies, database records, or config files from untrusted sources) is sanitized/validated to prevent `__proto__` keys from being passed to `defu()`.

Event History

Apr 4, 2026
Advisory Published
via GitHub·06:17 AM
Data Sourced
via GitHub·06:17 AM
DescriptionSeverityWeaknessAffected Software
Apr 6, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·05:26 PM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·05:26 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness
Data Sourced
via NVD·06:16 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness
Data Sourced
via NVD·06:16 PM
RemedyAffected Software
Sep 22, 2026
Data Sourced
via IBM·12:00 AM
DescriptionAffected Software

Parent advisories

This vulnerability appears in the following advisories.

Contact

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