CVE-2026-35214: Budibase: Path traversal in plugin file upload enables arbitrary directory deletion and file write

Summary

The plugin file upload endpoint (POST /api/plugin/upload) passes the user-supplied filename directly to createTempFolder() without sanitizing path traversal sequences. An attacker with Global Builder privileges can craft a multipart upload with a filename containing ../ to delete arbitrary directories via rmSync and write arbitrary files via tarball extraction to any filesystem path the Node.js process can access.

Severity

- Attack Vector: Network — exploitable via the plugin upload HTTP API - Attack Complexity: Low — no special conditions; a single crafted multipart request suffices - Privileges Required: High — requires Global Builder role (GLOBALBUILDER permission) - User Interaction: None - Scope: Changed — the plugin upload feature is scoped to a temp directory, but the traversal escapes to the host filesystem - Confidentiality Impact: None — the vulnerability enables deletion and writing, not reading - Integrity Impact: High — attacker can delete arbitrary directories and write arbitrary files via tarball extraction - Availability Impact: High — recursive deletion of application or system directories causes denial of service

Severity Rationale

Despite the real filesystem impact, severity is bounded by the requirement for Global Builder privileges (PR:H), which is the highest non-admin role in Budibase. In self-hosted deployments the Global Builder may already have server access, further reducing practical impact. In cloud/multi-tenant deployments the impact is more significant as it could affect the host infrastructure.

Affected Component

- packages/server/src/api/controllers/plugin/file.ts — fileUpload() (line 15) - packages/server/src/utilities/fileSystem/filesystem.ts — createTempFolder() (lines 78-91)

Description

Unsanitized filename flows into filesystem operations

In packages/server/src/api/controllers/plugin/file.ts, the uploaded file's name is used directly after stripping the .tar.gz suffix:

typescript // packages/server/src/api/controllers/plugin/file.ts:8-19 export async function fileUpload(file: KoaFile) { if (!file.name || !file.path) { throw new Error("File is not valid - cannot upload.") } if (!file.name.endsWith(".tar.gz")) { throw new Error("Plugin must be compressed into a gzipped tarball.") } const path = createTempFolder(file.name.split(".tar.gz")[0]) await extractTarball(file.path, path)

return await getPluginMetadata(path) }

The file.name originates from the Content-Disposition header's filename field in the multipart upload, parsed by formidable (via koa-body 4.2.0). Formidable does not sanitize path traversal sequences from filenames.

The createTempFolder function in packages/server/src/utilities/fileSystem/filesystem.ts uses path.join() which resolves ../ sequences, then performs destructive filesystem operations:

typescript // packages/server/src/utilities/fileSystem/filesystem.ts:78-91 export const createTempFolder = (item: string) => { const path = join(budibaseTempDir(), item) try { // remove old tmp directories automatically - don't combine if (fs.existsSync(path)) { fs.rmSync(path, { recursive: true, force: true }) } fs.mkdirSync(path) } catch (err: any) { throw new Error(Path cannot be created: ${err.message}) }

return path }

The budibaseTempDir() returns /tmp/.budibase (from packages/backend-core/src/objectStore/utils.ts:33). With a filename like ../../etc/target.tar.gz, path.join("/tmp/.budibase", "../../etc/target") resolves to /etc/target.

Inconsistent defenses confirm the gap

The codebase is aware of the risk in similar paths:

1. Safe path in utils.ts: The downloadUnzipTarball function (for NPM/GitHub/URL plugin sources) generates a random name server-side: typescript // packages/server/src/api/controllers/plugin/index.ts:68 const name = "PLUGIN" + Math.floor(100000 + Math.random() 900000) This is safe because name never contains user input.

2. Safe path in objectStore.ts: Other uses of budibaseTempDir() use UUID-generated names: typescript // packages/backend-core/src/objectStore/objectStore.ts:546 const outputPath = join(budibaseTempDir(), v4())

3. Sanitization exists but is not applied: The codebase has sanitizeKey() in objectStore.ts for sanitizing object store paths, but no equivalent is applied to createTempFolder's input.

The file upload path is the only caller of createTempFolder that passes unsanitized user input.

Execution chain

1. Authenticated Global Builder sends POST /api/plugin/upload with a multipart file whose Content-Disposition filename contains path traversal (e.g., ../../etc/target.tar.gz) 2. koa-body/formidable parses the upload, setting file.name to the raw filename from the header 3. controller.upload → sdk.plugins.processUploaded() → fileUpload(file) 4. .endsWith(".tar.gz") check passes (the suffix is present) 5. .split(".tar.gz")[0] extracts ../../etc/target 6. createTempFolder("../../etc/target") is called 7. path.join("/tmp/.budibase", "../../etc/target") resolves to /etc/target 8. fs.rmSync("/etc/target", { recursive: true, force: true }) — deletes the target directory recursively 9. fs.mkdirSync("/etc/target") — creates a directory at the traversed path 10. extractTarball(file.path, "/etc/target") — extracts attacker-controlled tarball contents to the traversed path

Proof of Concept

bash Create a minimal tarball with a test file mkdir -p /tmp/plugin-poc && echo "pwned" > /tmp/plugin-poc/test.txt tar czf /tmp/poc-plugin.tar.gz -C /tmp/plugin-poc .

Upload with a traversal filename targeting /tmp/pwned (non-destructive demo) curl -X POST 'http://localhost:10000/api/plugin/upload' \ -H 'Cookie: <globalbuildersessioncookie>' \ -F "file=@/tmp/poc-plugin.tar.gz;filename=../../tmp/pwned.tar.gz"

Result: server executes: rm -rf /tmp/pwned (if exists) mkdir /tmp/pwned tar xzf <upload> -C /tmp/pwned Verify: ls /tmp/pwned/test.txt

Impact

- Arbitrary directory deletion: rmSync with { recursive: true, force: true } deletes any directory the Node.js process can access, including application data directories - Arbitrary file write: Tarball extraction writes attacker-controlled files to any writable path, potentially overwriting application code, configuration, or system files - Denial of service: Deleting critical directories (e.g., the application's data directory, nodemodules, or system directories) crashes the application - Potential code execution: In containerized deployments (common for Budibase) where Node.js runs as root, an attacker could overwrite startup scripts or application code to achieve remote code execution on subsequent restarts

Recommended Remediation

Option 1: Sanitize at createTempFolder (preferred — protects all callers)

typescript import { join, resolve } from "path"

export const createTempFolder = (item: string) => { const tempDir = budibaseTempDir() const resolved = resolve(tempDir, item)

// Ensure the resolved path is within the temp directory if (!resolved.startsWith(tempDir + "/") && resolved !== tempDir) { throw new Error("Invalid path: directory traversal detected") }

try { if (fs.existsSync(resolved)) { fs.rmSync(resolved, { recursive: true, force: true }) } fs.mkdirSync(resolved) } catch (err: any) { throw new Error(Path cannot be created: ${err.message}) }

return resolved }

Option 2: Sanitize at the upload handler (defense-in-depth)

Strip path components from the filename before use:

typescript import path from "path"

export async function fileUpload(file: KoaFile) { if (!file.name || !file.path) { throw new Error("File is not valid - cannot upload.") } if (!file.name.endsWith(".tar.gz")) { throw new Error("Plugin must be compressed into a gzipped tarball.") } // Strip directory components from the filename const safeName = path.basename(file.name).split(".tar.gz")[0] const dir = createTempFolder(safeName) await extractTarball(file.path, dir)

return await getPluginMetadata(dir) }

Both options should ideally be applied together for defense-in-depth.

Credit

This vulnerability was discovered and reported by bugbunny.ai.