CVE-2026-35219: SSRF

Summary

Budibase automation steps (outgoing webhook, Zapier, n8n, Slack, Discord, Make.com) make server-side HTTP requests to user-provided URLs using node-fetch directly, completely bypassing the IP blacklist protection that exists in the REST API integration. Additionally, the REST API blacklist itself defaults to empty when BLACKLISTIPS is not configured.

Vulnerable Code

Automation Steps (No Blacklist)

All automation steps use fetch() directly without any IP validation:

packages/server/src/automations/steps/outgoingWebhook.ts line 69: typescript const response = await fetch(url, request) // No blacklist check

packages/server/src/automations/steps/zapier.ts line 34: typescript response = await fetch(url, {method: "post", ...}) // No blacklist check

packages/server/src/automations/steps/n8n.ts line 53: typescript response = await fetch(url, request) // No blacklist check

packages/server/src/automations/steps/slack.ts line 20: typescript response = await fetch(url, {method: "post", ...}) // No blacklist check

packages/server/src/automations/steps/discord.ts line 29: typescript response = await fetch(url, {method: "post", ...}) // No blacklist check

REST API Integration (Empty Default Blacklist)

packages/server/src/integrations/rest.ts line 684: typescript if (await blacklist.isBlacklisted(url)) { throw new Error("Cannot connect to URL.") }

But BLACKLISTIPS env var defaults to undefined, so the blacklist is empty:

packages/backend-core/src/blacklist/blacklist.ts lines 39-45: typescript if (blackListArray?.length === 0) { return false // Always passes when no IPs configured }

Impact

- Automation steps: ANY user can create automations with webhook/Zapier/n8n/Slack/Discord steps pointing to internal IPs. These completely bypass the blacklist module - REST API: Even when BLACKLISTIPS is configured, it only blocks listed IPs. Default deployments have no protection. - Cloud metadata: http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/ accessible via any automation step - Internal services: Access databases, admin panels, Kubernetes API on private IPs

Remediation

1. Apply blacklist checks to ALL outbound HTTP requests, including automation steps 2. Add hardcoded default private IP ranges (127.0.0.0/8, 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, 169.254.0.0/16) 3. Use a centralized HTTP client wrapper instead of direct fetch() calls 4. SSRF protection should be on by default, not opt-in via environment variable